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Abstract
Based on results discussed by Meinhardt (2013), which presents a dual characterization of the pre-
kernel by a finite union of solution sets of a family of quadratic and convex objective functions, we
could derive some results related to the single-valuedness of the pre-kernel. Rather than extending the
knowledge of game classes for which the pre-kernel consists of a single point, we apply a different ap-
proach. We select a game from an arbitrary game class with a single pre-kernel element satisfying the
non-empty interior condition of a payoff equivalence class, and then establish that the set of related and
linear independent games which are derived from this pre-kernel point of the default game replicates
this point also as its sole pre-kernel element. Hence, a bargaining outcome related to this pre-kernel
element is stable. Furthermore, we establish that on the restricted subset on the game space that is con-
stituted by the convex hull of the default and the set of related games, the pre-kernel correspondence is
single-valued, and therefore continuous. In addition, we provide sufficient conditions that preserve the
pre-nucleolus property for related games even when the default game has not a single pre-kernel point.
Finally, we apply the same techniques to related solutions of the pre-kernel, namely the modiclus and
anti-pre-kernel, to work out replication results for them.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In bargaining situation people often have strong concern on the execution and stability of an agreed-upon
contract. In particular, where multilateral agreements are non-binding, compliance becomes a crucial issue
in order to avoid its obstruction. People may reduce fulfillment if they feel that they have been treated
unfair. This may happen when agents are not acting self-constraint and are not refraining from using
their powers to exploit one another. However, an agreement can be achieved when agents are following
some fairness standards, then compliance is reality and obstruction is held to account. Apart from the
Shapley value, a standard of fairness in cooperative game theory is the (pre-)kernel in accordance with
its rich axiomatic foundation, i.e., principles of distributive arbitration. Moreover, this solution concept is
also interesting from a non-cooperative point of view, since it results as a solution of a Nash program,
which allows a reinterpretation of the kernel based on a non-cooperative bargaining game without making
any use of interpersonal utility comparisons. Hence, a non-cooperative foundation of the kernel solution
is established while formulating a bargaining process that will lead the players to the proposed solution
whenever they follow the described rules (cf. Serrano (1997); Chang and Hu (2016)).
The kernel as well as the pre-kernel are in general set-valued solution concepts of cooperative game
theory, which are only under very specific conditions single-valued. In this context, the coincidence of the
kernel with the nucleolus – that is, the kernel consists of a single point – is only known for some classes
of transferable utility games. In particular, it was established by Maschler et al. (1972) that for the class
of convex games – introduced by Shapley (1971) – the kernel and the nucleolus coincide. Moreover, Arin
and Feltkamp (1997) have established that for the class of veto-rich transferable utility games both solution
concepts coalesce. Similar, Geta´n et al. (2012) were able to extend this result to the class of zero-monotonic
almost-convex games. However, for the class of average-convex games, there is only some evidence that
both solution concepts coalesce. For getting an overview of the recent developments in this field, we refer
the inclined reader to In˜arra et al. (2020).
In order to advance our understanding about the stability of a bargaining outcome based on the prin-
ciples of distributive justice related to the pre-kernel, we shall focus on its single-valuedness to abstract
from the selection issue while identifying the conditions under those a variation within the game param-
eter space does not affect this bargaining agreement, and the fulfillment of the contract can be assured
even under the new parameter setting (cf. Theorem. 4.4). However, such an analysis of stability requests
a different approach as focusing, for instance, on the convexity property of a game. Rather than to in-
vestigate the game classes which possess a single pre-kernel element, we propose an alternative approach
to investigate this issue while applying results and techniques provided in the book by Meinhardt (2013).
There, it was shown that the pre-kernel of the grand coalition can be characterized by a finite union of
solution sets of a family of quadratic and convex functions (Theorem 7.3.1). This dual representation of
the pre-kernel is based on a Fenchel-Moreau generalized conjugation of the characteristic function. This
generalized conjugation was introduced by Martinez-Legaz (1996), which he called the indirect function.
Immediately thereafter, it was Meseguer-Artola (1997) who proved that the pre-kernel can be derived from
an over-determined system of non-linear equations. This over-determined system of non-linear equations
is equivalent to a minimization problem, whose set of global minima is equal to the pre-kernel set. Though
an explicit structural form of the objective function that would allow a better and more comprehensive
understanding of the pre-kernel set could not be performed.
The characterization of the pre-kernel set by a finite union of solution sets was possible due to a
partition of the domain of the objective function into a finite number of payoff sets. From each payoff
vector contained into a particular payoff set the same quadratic and convex function is induced. The
collection of all these functions on the domain composes the objective function from which a pre-kernel
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element can be singled out. Moreover, each payoff set creates a linear mapping that maps payoff vectors
into a vector subspace of balanced excesses. Equivalent payoff sets which reflects the same underlying
bargaining situation produce the same vector subspace. The vector of balanced excesses generated by a
pre-kernel point is contained into the vector subspace spanned by the basis vectors derived from the payoff
set that contains this pre-kernel element. In contrast, the vectors of unbalanced excesses induced from the
minima of a quadratic function do not belong to their proper vector subspace. An orthogonal projection
maps these vectors on this vector subspace of the space of balanced excesses (cf. Meinhardt (2013, Chap.
5-7)).
From this structure a replication result of a pre-kernel point can be obtained. This is due that from
the payoff set that contains the selected pre-kernel element, and which satisfies in addition the non-empty
interior condition, a null space in the game space can be identified that allows a variation within the game
parameter without affecting the pre-kernel properties of this payoff vector. Thus, a pre-kernel element of
a TU game is replicable as a pre-kernel solution of a related game, whenever the pre-kernel element of
the default game belongs to a payoff equivalence class, which satisfies the non-empty interior property.
Then a full dimensional ellipsoid can be inscribed from which some parameter bounds can be specified
within coalitional values can be varied without destroying the pre-kernel properties of the solution from
the default game. These bounds specify a redistribution of the bargaining power among coalitions while
supporting the selected pre-imputation still as a pre-kernel point. Even though the values of the maximum
surpluses have been varied, the set of most effective coalitions remains unaltered by the parameter change.
This indicates that a bargaining outcome related to this specific pre-kernel point remains stable against a
variation in the game parameter space, and obstruction is held account. Hence, a set of related games can
be determined, which are linear independent, and possess the selected pre-kernel element of the default
game as well as a pre-kernel point (cf. Meinhardt (2013, Sect. 7.6)).
Applying this approach to the stability analysis of cartel agreements goes beyond the usual convexity
investigation that is normally conducted in the literature, for instance, see Zhao (1999); Norde et al. (2002);
Driessen and Meinhardt (2005, 2010). For an application of this approach while studying the stability of
cartel agreements related to the pre-kernel, we refer the reader to Meinhardt (2018a).
To the best of our knowledge such kind of stability analysis of a bargaining outcome was up to now only
conducted by scholars for linear solution concepts like the Shapley value1, but not for non-linear solutions
like the pre-kernel and pre-nucleolus. However, through the non-linearity of these solution concepts, a
stability analysis necessitates a much broader and more sophisticated machinery of mathematical tools than
under the Shapley value, for instance. For that reason, we shall repeat as well as generalize the requested
preliminaries in the course of the analysis, which have been introduced in full scale by Meinhardt (2013).
Otherwise, one will find our analysis as not comprehensible and as too complex due to the missing context.
This is the price every open-minded game theorist has to pay to substantially advance the knowledge
frontier while applying mathematical techniques to produce new answers to not well understood problems
rather than looking on a deformation of a well known game theoretical problem with inadequate methods.
In the sequel of this paper, we will establish that the set of related games, which are derived from a
default game exhibiting a singleton pre-kernel, must also possess this point as its sole pre-kernel element,
1For an overview of the most recent developments in this highly dynamic research field we refer the reader to Algaba et al.
(2020, Chap. 6. & 7.). Even there, the application of the theory of linear algebraic groups reveals to us that the Borel-groups
(minimal parabolic groups) are acting on the bases of TU games, and the Shapley value remains stable whenever the change of
basis is located in the same orbit. In the same vein Herna´ndez-Lamoneda et al. (2007) were able to compute a decomposition
for the space of cooperative games under the action of the symmetric group Sn to identify all irreducible subspaces that are
relevant to study symmetric linear solutions, this result was extended by Herna´ndez-Lamoneda et al. (2009) for games in
partition function form.
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and therefore coincides with the pre-nucleolus. Notice that these games need not necessarily be convex,
average-convex, totally balanced, or zero-monotonic. They could belong to different subclasses of games,
however, they must satisfy the non-empty interior condition. Moreover, we show that the pre-kernel corre-
spondence in the game space restricted to the convex hull that is constituted by the extreme points, which
are specified by the default and related games, is single-valued, and therefore continuous.
In addition, we establish that this approach is also applicable to related solutions of the pre-kernel,
namely the modiclus and anti-pre-kernel. The former solution concept was invented by Sudho¨lter (1993),
whereas the latter was discussed by Funaki and Meinhardt (2006). The modiclus, even known under the
name modified nucleolus, takes besides the primal power also the dual power of coalitions into account. In
contrast, the anti-pre-kernel is pointing to the dual power of coalitions without explicitly introducing the
dual game, that is, without changing the game context (cf. Meinhardt (2018b)). In particular, we show that
the modiclus is identical to the pre-nucleolus or even to the anti-pre-nucleolus under regular conditions
for a class of shifted games. To turn then in the next step – based on these results – to the aforementioned
replication results w.r.t. the modiclus. Finally, we exhibit a replication result for an exposed element of
the anti-pre-kernel for convex games. That is to say, we prove that the anti-pre-nucleolus for the class of
convex games, which is also an element of the the anti-pre-kernel, remains at least an element of those
under a very specific change in the game parameter, even though when the initial properties cannot be
preserved. Hence, the object under consideration is in general not anymore the anti-pre-nucleolus of the
induced game. Notice in this context that the anti-pre-kernel for convex games needs not to be a singleton
– in contrast to the pre-kernel.
The structure of the paper is organized as follows: In the Section 2 we introduce some basic notations
and definitions to investigate the coincidence of the pre-kernel with the pre-nucleolus. Section 3 provides
the concept of the indirect function and gives a dual pre-kernel representation in terms of a solution set.
In the next step, the notion of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions is introduced in order
to identify payoff equivalence classes on the domain of the objective function from which a pre-kernel
element can be determined. Moreover, relevant concepts from Meinhardt (2013) are reconsidered. Sec-
tion 4 studies the single-valuedness of the pre-kernel for related games. However, Section 5 investigates
the continuity of the pre-kernel correspondence. In Section 6 some sufficient conditions are worked out
under which the pre-nucleolus of a default game can preserve the pre-nucleolus property for related games.
Whereas in Section 7 we introduce the notions of the anti-pre-nucleolus and anti-pre-kernel to finally ex-
tend certain attributes from the dual characterization of the pre-kernel to the anti-pre-kernel. In Section 8
we are going to discuss the definition of the modiclus, and some game properties which are useful in con-
nection with the foregoing considerations to derive replication results within Section 9. There, we provide
new replication results related to the modiclus and anti-pre-kernel. A few final remarks close the paper by
Section 10.
2 SOME PRELIMINARIES
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N is the non-empty finite player set
N := {1, 2, . . . , n}, and v is the characteristic function v : 2N → R with v(∅) := 0. A player i is an
element of N , and a coalition S is an element of the power set of 2N . The real number v(S) ∈ R is
called the value or worth of a coalition S ∈ 2N . Let S be a coalition, the number of members in S will be
denoted by s := |S|. We assume throughout that v(N) > 0 and n ≥ 2 is valid. In addition, we identify
a cooperative game by the vector v := (v(S))S⊆N ∈ Gn = R2n , if no confusion can arise. Finally, the
relevant game space for our investigation is defined by G(N) := {v ∈ Gn | v(∅) = 0 ∧ v(N) > 0}.
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If x ∈ Rn, we apply x(S) :=∑k∈S xk for every S ∈ 2N with x(∅) := 0. The set of vectors x ∈ Rn
which satisfies the efficiency principle v(N) = x(N) is called the pre-imputation set and it is defined by
I∗(N, v) := {x ∈ Rn |x(N) = v(N)} , (2.1)
or more concisely as I∗(v), where an element x ∈ I∗(v) is called a pre-imputation. The set of pre-
imputations which satisfies in addition the individual rationality property xk ≥ v({k}) for all k ∈ N is
called the imputation set I(N, v).
A vector that results from a vector x by a transfer of size δ ≥ 0 between a pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6=
j, is referred to as x i,j,δ = (x i,j,δk )k∈N , which is given by
x i,j,δN\{i,j} = xN\{ i,j}, x
i,j,δ
i = xi − δ and x i,j,δj = xj + δ. (2.2)
A side-payment for the players in N is a vector z ∈ Rn such that z(N) = 0.
A solution concept, denoted as σ, on a non-empty set G of games is a correspondence on G that assigns
to any game v ∈ G a subset σ(N, v) of I∗(N, v). This set can be empty or just be single-valued, in the
latter case, the solution σ is a function and is simply called a value.
The core of a game 〈N, v〉 is a set-valued solution that is constituted by the imputations satisfying
besides the individual rationality property as well as the coalitional rationality property, i.e. the core of a
game v ∈ Gn is given by
C(N, v) := {x ∈ I(N, v) |x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S) ∀ S ⊂ N} . (2.3)
The core of a n-person game may be empty. Whenever it is non-empty we have some incentive for mutual
cooperation in the grand coalition.
Given a vector x ∈ I∗(v), we define the excess of coalition S with respect to the pre-imputation x in
the game 〈N, v〉 by
ev(S,x) := v(S)− x(S). (2.4)
Take a game v ∈ Gn. For any pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, the maximum surplus of player i over
player j with respect to any pre-imputation x ∈ I∗(v) is given by the maximum excess at x over the set of
coalitions containing player i but not player j, thus
sij(x, v) := max
S∈Gij
ev(S,x) where Gij := {S | i ∈ S and j /∈ S}. (2.5)
The set of all pre-imputations x ∈ I∗(v) that balances the maximum surpluses for each distinct pair of
players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j is called the pre-kernel of the game v, and is defined by
PK(v) := {x ∈ I∗(v) | sij(x, v) = sji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} . (2.6)
The pre-kernel has the advantage of addressing a stylized bargaining process, in which the figure of ar-
gumentation is a pairwise equilibrium procedure of claims while relying on best arguments, that is, the
coalitions that will best support the claim. The pre-kernel solution characterizes all those imputations in
which all pairs of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j are in equilibrium with respect to their claims.
In order to define the pre-nucleolus of a game v ∈ Gn, take any x ∈ Rn to define a 2n-tuple vector
θ(x) whose components are the excesses ev(S,x) of the 2n coalitions S ⊆ N , arranged in decreasing
order, that is,
θi(x) := e
v(Si,x) ≥ ev(Sj ,x) =: θj(x) if 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ 2n. (2.7)
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Ordering the so-called complaint or dissatisfaction vectors θ(x) for all x ∈ Rn by the lexicographic order
≤L on Rn, we shall write
θ(x) <L θ(y) if ∃ an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n, (2.8)
such that θi(x) = θi(y) for 1 ≤ i < k and θk(x) < θk(y). Furthermore, we write θ(x) ≤L θ(y) if either
θ(x) <L θ(y) or θ(x) = θ(y). Now the pre-nucleolus PN(N, v) over the pre-imputations set I
∗(v) is
defined by
PN(N, v) = {x ∈ I∗(N, v) | θ(x) ≤L θ(y) ∀ y ∈ I∗(N, v)} . (2.9)
The pre-nucleolus of any game v ∈ Gn is non-empty as well as unique, and it is referred to as ν(v) if the
game context is clear from the contents or ν(N, v) otherwise.
Moreover, both solutions can be uniquely characterized by a set of axioms. In order to formalize such
an axiomatization, let 〈N, v 〉 ∈ G be a game s.t. ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and let ~x ∈ I∗(N, v). The Davis/Maschler
reduced game w.r.t. S and ~x is the game 〈S, vS, ~x 〉 as given by
vS, ~x(T ) :=


0 if T = ∅
v(N)− x(N\S) if T = S
maxQ⊆N\S (v(T ∪Q)− x(Q)) otherwise.
(2.10)
This game type has been introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965) to study the kernel.
Definition 2.1 (DM-RGP). A solution σ on G satisfies the reduced game property (RGP), if for 〈N, v〉 ∈
G, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and x ∈ σ(N, v), then 〈S, vS,x 〉 ∈ G and xS ∈ σ(S, vS,x).
Let σ be a solution concept on the set G, and U the universe of players. In addition, define the per-
mutation group by Sym(N) := {ϑ : N → N |ϑ is bijective} acting on the game space G by linear
transformations. Hence, each bijection ϑ ∈ Sym(N) corresponds to a linear and invertible transforma-
tion of an element of the vector space G by defining a permuted game ϑ v(S) := v(ϑ−1 S) for every
ϑ ∈ Sym(N), v ∈ G and S ⊆ N , whereas ϑS := {ϑ(i) | i ∈ S} and ϑ−1 S := {i |ϑ(i) ∈ S}. Hence, the
games 〈N, v 〉 and 〈ϑN, ϑv 〉 are equivalent, where we have written the group operations for the sake of
convenience as junction.
1. A solution σ on G satisfying non-emptiness (NE), if σ(N, v) 6= ∅ for every 〈N, v 〉 ∈ G.
2. A solution σ on G is single-valued (SIVA), if |σ(N, v) | = 1 for every 〈N, v 〉 ∈ G.
3. A solution σ on G is Pareto optimal (PO), if
∑
k∈N σ(N, v)k = v(N) for every 〈N, v 〉 ∈ G.
4. A solution σ on G satisfies the equal treatment property (ETP), if 〈N, v 〉 ∈ G, ~x ∈ σ(N, v) and
if k, l ∈ N s.t. k ∼v l, then xk = xl.
5. A solution σ on G satisfies anonymity (AN), if for 〈N, v 〉 ∈ G, for a bijection ϑ ∈ Sym(N) and
for 〈ϑN, ϑv 〉 ∈ G implying σ(ϑN, ϑv) = ϑ(σ(N, v)).
6. A solution σ on G fulfills the Covariance under Strategic Equivalence (COV) property, if for
〈N, v1 〉, 〈N, v2 〉 ∈ G, with v2 = t · v1 + m for some t ∈ R\{0},m ∈ R2n , then σ(N, v2) =
t · σ(N, v1) +m, whereasm ∈ Rn and m is the vector of measures obtained fromm.
7. A solution σ on G possesses the converse reduced game property (CRG) property, if for 〈N, v 〉 ∈
G with |N | ≥ 2, ~x ∈ I∗(N, v), 〈S, vS, ~x 〉 ∈ G and ~xS ∈ σ(S, vS, ~x) for every S ∈ {T ⊆ N | |T | =
2}, then ~x ∈ σ(N, v).
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Theorem 2.1 (Sobolev (1975)). If U is an infinite player set, then there exists a unique solution σ on GU
satisfying single-valuedness (SIVA), anonymity (AN), covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), and
reduced game property (RGP), which is the pre-nucleolus.
In addition, we want to discuss some important game properties. A game v ∈ Gn is said to be mono-
tonic if
v(S) ≤ v(T ) ∀∅ 6= S ⊆ T. (2.11)
Thus, whenever a game is monotonic, a coalition T can guarantee to its member a value at least as high as
any sub-coalition S can do. This subclass of games is referred to as MNn. A game v ∈ Gn satisfying the
condition
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) ∀S, T ⊆ N, with S ∩ T = ∅, (2.12)
is called superadditive. This means, that two disjoint coalitions have some incentive to join into a mutual
coalition. This can be regarded as an incentive of merging economic activities into larger units. We denote
this subclass of games by SAn. However, if a game v ∈ Gn satisfies
v(S) + v(T ) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ∀S, T ⊆ N, (2.13)
or equivalently
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ {j}) if S ⊆ N\{i, j}, (2.14)
then it is called convex. In this case, we will observe a strong incentive for a mutual cooperation in the
grand coalition, due to its achievable over proportionate surpluses while increasing the scale of coopera-
tion. This subclass of games has been introduced by Shapley (1971), and we denote it by CVn. Convex
games having a non-empty core and the Shapley value is the center of gravity of the extreme point of the
core (cf. Shapley (1971)), that is, a convex combination of the vectors of marginal contributions, which
are core imputations for convex games. It should be evident that CVn ⊂ SAn is satisfied.
3 A DUAL PRE-KERNEL REPRESENTATION
The concept of a Fenchel-Moreau generalized conjugation – also known as the indirect function of a char-
acteristic function game – was introduced by Martinez-Legaz (1996), and provides the same information
as the n-person cooperative game with transferable utility under consideration. This approach was suc-
cessfully applied in Meinhardt (2013) to give a dual representation of the pre-kernel solution of TU games
by means of solution sets of a family of quadratic objective functions. In this section, we review some
crucial results extensively studied in Meinhardt (2013, Chap. 5 & 6) as the building blocks to investigate
the single-valuedness of the pre-kernel correspondence and its replication property.
The convex conjugate or Fenchel transform f∗ : Rn → R (where R := R ∪ {± ∞}) of a convex
function f : Rn → R (cf. Rockafellar (1970, Section 12)) is defined by
f∗(x ∗) = sup
x∈Rn
{〈 x ∗,x 〉 − f(x)} ∀x ∗ ∈ Rn.
Observe that the Fenchel transform f∗ is the point-wise supremum of affine functions p(x ∗) = 〈 x,x ∗ 〉−
µ such that (x, µ) ∈ (C × R) ⊆ (Rn × R), whereas C is a convex set. Thus, the Fenchel transform f∗ is
again a convex function.
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We can generalize the definition of a Fenchel transform (cf. Martinez-Legaz (1996)) by introducing a
fixed non-empty subset K of Rn, then the conjugate of a function f : K → R is f c : Rn → R, given by
f c(x ∗) = sup
x∈K
{〈 x ∗,x 〉 − f(x)} ∀x ∗ ∈ Rn,
which is also known as the Fenchel-Moreau conjugation.
A vector x ∗ is said to be a subgradient of a convex function f at a point x, if
f(z) ≥ f(x) + 〈 x ∗, z− x 〉 ∀z ∈ Rn.
The set of all subgradients of f at x is called the subdifferentiable of f at x and it is defined by
∂f(x) := {x ∗ ∈ Rn | f(z) ≥ f(x) + 〈 x ∗, z− x 〉 (∀z ∈ Rn)}.
The set of all subgradients ∂f(x) is a closed convex set, which could be empty or may consist of just one
point. The multivalued mapping x 7→ ∂f(x) is called the subdifferential of f .
Theorem 3.1 (Martinez-Legaz (1996)). The indirect function π : Rn → R of any n-person TU game is a
non-increasing polyhedral convex function such that
(i) ∂π(x) ∩ {−1, 0}n 6= ∅ ∀x ∈ Rn,
(ii) {−1, 0}n ⊂ ⋃x∈Rn ∂π(x), and
(iii) minx∈Rn π(x) = 0.
Conversely, if π : Rn → R satisfies (i)-(iii) then there exists a unique n-person TU game 〈N, v〉 having
π as its indirect function, its characteristic function is given by
v(S) = min
x∈Rn
{
π(x) +
∑
k∈S
xk
}
∀ S ⊂ N. (3.1)
According to the above result, the associated indirect function π : Rn → R+ is given by:
π(x) = max
S⊆N
{
v(S)−
∑
k∈S
xk
}
,
for all x ∈ Rn. A characterization of the pre-kernel in terms of the indirect function is due to Meseguer-
Artola (1997). In the course of our discussion we present this representation in its most general form,
although we restrict ourselves to the trivial coalition structure B = {N}.
The pre-imputation that comprises the possibility of compensation between a pair of players i, j ∈
N, i 6= j, is denoted as x i,j,δ = (x i,j,δk )k∈N ∈ I∗(v), with δ ≥ 0, which is given by
x i,j,δN\{i,j} = xN\{ i,j}, x
i,j,δ
i = xi − δ and x i,j,δj = xj + δ.
By the next Lemma we shall establish that the indirect function π of game v can be related to the
maximum surpluses.
Lemma 3.1 (Meseguer-Artola (1997)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a n-person cooperative game with side payments.
Let π and sij be the associated indirect function and the maximum surplus of player i against player j,
respectively. If x ∈ I∗(N, v), then the equality:
sij(x, v) = π(x
i,j,δ)− δ
holds for every i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and for every δ ≥ δ1(x, v), where:
δ1(x, v) := max
k∈N,S⊂N\{k}
|v(S ∪ {k})− v(S)− xk|.
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Proof. For a proof consult Meseguer-Artola (1997); Meinhardt (2013).
A characterization of the pre-kernel in terms of the indirect function is due to Meseguer-Artola (1997).
As aforementioned, we focus on the trivial coalition structureB = {N} only, since our algorithm evaluates
a pre-kernel element for the grand coalition. However, this approach can also be applied for more general
coalition structures (cf. Meinhardt (2018d, Section 5.2.2)). Though we concentrate on the trivial one
B = {N}, we nevertheless restate this result through its most general form.
Proposition 3.1 (Meseguer-Artola (1997); Meinhardt (2013)). For a TU game with indirect function π, a
pre-imputation x ∈ I∗(N, v) is in the pre-kernel of 〈N, v〉 for the coalition structure B = {B1, . . . , Bl},
x ∈ PK(v,B), if, and only if, for every k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}, every i, j ∈ Bk, i < j, and some δ ≥ δ1(v,x),
one gets
π(x i,j,δ) = π(x j,i,δ).
Meseguer-Artola (1997) was the first who recognized that based on the result of Proposition 3.1 a pre-
kernel element can be derived as a solution of an over-determined system of non-linear equations. For the
trivial coalition structure B = {N} the over-determined system of non-linear equations is given by

fij(x) = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j
f0(x) = 0
(3.2)
where, for some δ ≥ δ1(x, v),
fij(x) := π(x
i,j,δ)− π(x j,i,δ) ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j, (3.2-a)
and
f0(x) :=
∑
k∈N
xk − v(N). (3.2-b)
To any over-determined system an equivalent minimization problem is associated such that the set of global
minima coincides with the solution set of the system (cf. Meinhardt (2013, Sec. 5.3)). The solution set of
such a minimization problem is the set of values for x which minimizes the following function
h(x) :=
∑
i,j∈N
i<j
(fij(x))
2 + (f0(x))
2 ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Rn. (3.3)
As we will notice in the sequel, this optimization problem is equivalent to a least squares adjustment. For
further details see Meinhardt (2013, Chap. 6). From the existence of the pre-kernel and objective function
h of type (3.3), we get the following relation:
Corollary 3.1 (Meinhardt (2013)). For a TU game 〈N, v〉 with indirect function π, it holds that
h(x) =
∑
i,j∈N
i<j
(fij(x))
2 + (f0(x))
2 = min
y∈I0(v)
h(y) = 0, (3.4)
if, and only if, x ∈ PK(v).
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Proof. To establish the equivalence between the pre-kernel set and the set of global minima, we have to
notice that in view of Theorem 3.1 miny h = 0 is in force. Now, we prove necessity while taking a pre-
kernel element, i.e. x ∈ PK(v), then the efficiency property is satisfied with f0(x) = 0 and the maximum
surpluses sij(x, v) must be balanced for each distinct pair of players i, j, implying that fij(x) = 0 for all
i, j ∈ N, i < j and therefore h(x) = 0. Thus, we are getting x ∈ M(h). To prove sufficiency, assume
that x ∈M(h), then h(x) = 0 with the implication that the efficiency property f0(x) = 0 and fij(x) = 0
must be valid for all i, j ∈ N, i < j. This means that the difference fij(x) = (π(xi,j,δ) − π(xj,i,δ)) is
equalized for each distinct pair of indices i, j ∈ N, i < j. Thus, x ∈ PK(v). It turns out that the minimum
set coincides with the pre-kernel, i.e., we have:
M(h) = {x ∈ I∗(v) | h(x) = 0} = PK(v), (3.5)
with this argument we are done.
Corollary 3.1 gives an alternative characterization of the pre-kernel set in terms of a solution set. Sin-
gling out a pre-kernel element by solving the above minimization problem is, for instance, possible by
a modified Steepest Descent Method. However, a direct method is not applicable. This is due to fact
that the objective function h is the difference of two convex functions and that due to Theorem 3.1 the
indirect function π is a non-increasing polyhedral convex function. This implies that function h is not
continuous differentiable everywhere and that its structural form is ambiguous. Nevertheless, Proposi-
tion 6.2.2 (cf. Meinhardt (2013)) characterizes the objective function h as the composite of a finite family
of quadratic functions. For brevity, we do not discuss the whole details which would go beyond the scope
of the paper, here we focus only on the aspect that the domain of function h can be partitioned into payoff
equivalence classes. On each payoff equivalence class a quadratic and convex function can be identified.
Pasting the finite collection of quadratic and convex functions together reproduces function h. For a thor-
ough and more detailed discussion of this topic, we refer the reader to Section 5.4 and 6.2 in Meinhardt
(2013).
To understand the structural form of the objective function h, we will first identify equivalence relations
on its domain. To start with, we define the set of most effective or significant coalitions for each pair of
players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j at the payoff vector x by
Cij(x) := {S ∈ Gij | sij(x, v) = ev(S,x)}. (3.6)
When we gather for all pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j all these coalitions that support the claim of a
specific player over some other players, we have to consider the concept of the collection of most effective
or significant coalitions w.r.t. x, which we define as in Maschler et al. (1979, p. 315) by
C(x) :=
⋃
i,j∈N
i 6=j
Cij(x). (3.7)
Observe that the set Cij(x) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j does not have cardinality one, which is required to
identify a partition on the domain of function h. Now let us choose for each pair i, j ∈ N, i 6= j a
descending ordering on the set of most effective coalitions in accordance with their size, and within such
a collection of most effective coalitions having smallest size, the lexicographical minimum is singled out,
then we obtain the required uniqueness to partition the domain of h. To see this, notice that from the set
of most effective or significant coalitions of a pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j at the payoff vector x the
9
On the Replication of the Pre-Kernel and Related Solutions
smallest cardinality over the set of most effective coalitions is defined as
Φij(x) := min
{
|S|
 S ∈ Cij(x)
}
. (3.8)
Gathering all these sets having smallest cardinality for all pairs of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, we end up with
Ψij(x) :=
{
S ∈ Cij(x)
Φij(x) = |S|
}
. (3.9)
With respect to an arbitrary payoff vector x, the set of coalitions of smallest cardinality Ψij(x) which
is minimized w.r.t. the lexicographically order <L is determined by
Sij(x) :=
{
S ∈ Ψij(x)
S <L T for all S 6= T ∈ Ψij(x)
}
∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. (3.10)
We denote this set as the lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions w.r.t. x. Gathering all these
collections we are able to specify the set of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions w.r.t. x
through
S(x) :=
⋃
i,j∈N
i 6=j
Sij(x). (3.11)
This set will be indicated in short as the set of lexicographically smallest coalitions or just more suc-
cinctly most effective coalitions whenever no confusion can arise. Notice that this set is never empty
and can uniquely be identified. This implies that the cardinality of this set is equal to n · (n − 1). In the
following we will observe that from these type of sets equivalence relations on the domain domh can be
identified.
To see this, consider the correspondence S on domh and two different vectors, say x and ~γ, then
both vectors are said to be equivalent w.r.t. the binary relation ∼ if, and only if, they induce the same
set of lexicographically smallest coalitions, that is, x ∼ ~γ if, and only if, S(x) = S(~γ). In case that the
binary relation ∼ is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, then it is an equivalence relation and it induces
equivalence classes [~γ] on domh which we define through [~γ] := {x ∈ dom h |x ∼ ~γ}. Thus, if x ∼ ~γ,
then [x] = [~γ], and if x ≁ ~γ, then [x] ∩ [~γ] = ∅. This implies that whenever the binary relation ∼ induces
equivalence classes [~γ] on domh, then it partitions the domain domh of the function h. The resulting
collection of equivalence classes [~γ] on domh is called the quotient of domh modulo ∼, and we denote
this collection by domh/ ∼. We indicate this set as an equivalence class whenever the context is clear,
otherwise we apply the term payoff set or payoff equivalence class.
Proposition 3.2 (Meinhardt (2013)). The binary relation ∼ on the set domh defined by x ∼ ~γ ⇐⇒
S(x) = S(~γ) is an equivalence relation, which forms a partition of the set domh by the collection of
equivalence classes {[~γk]}k∈J , where J is an arbitrary index set. Furthermore, for all k ∈ J , the induced
equivalence class [~γk] is a convex set.
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013, p. 59).
By Proposition 3.2, we observe that a payoff equivalence class can alternatively be specified through
[~γ] :=
{
x ∈ RN |x(N) = v(N) and S(x) = S(~γ)
}
.
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The cardinality of the collection of the payoff equivalence classes induced by a TU game is finite
(cf. Meinhardt (2013, Proposition 5.4.2.)). Furthermore, on each payoff equivalence class [~γ] from the
domh a unique quadratic and convex function can be identified. Therefore, there must be a finite compos-
ite of these functions that constitutes the objective function h. In order to construct such a quadratic and
convex function suppose that ~γ ∈ [~γ]. From this vector we obtain the collection of most effective coalitions
S(~γ) in accordance with Proposition 3.2. Then observe that the differences in the values between a pair
{i, j} of players are defined by αij := (v(Sij)− v(Sji)) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ N, i < j, and α0 := v(N) > 0
w.r.t. S(~γ). All of these q-components compose the q-coordinates of a payoff independent vector ~α, with
q =
(
n
2
)
+ 1. A vector that reflects the degree of unbalancedness of excesses for all pair of players, is
denoted by ~ξ ∈ Rq, that is a q-column vector, which is given by
ξij := e
v(Sij , ~γ)− ev(Sji, ~γ) = v(Sij)− γ(Sij)− v(Sji) + γ(Sji) ∀ i, j ∈ N, i < j,
= v(Sij)− v(Sji) + γ(Sji)− γ(Sij) = αij + γ(Sji)− γ(Sij) ∀ i, j ∈ N, i < j,
ξ0 := v(N)− γ(N) = α0 − γ(N).
(3.12)
In view of Proposition 3.2, all vectors contained in the equivalence class [~γ] induce the same set S(~γ), and
it holds
ξij := e
v(Sij , ~γ)− ev(Sji, ~γ) = sij(~γ, v)− sji(~γ, v) =: ζij ∀ i, j ∈ N, i < j. (3.13)
The payoff dependent configurations ~ξ and ~ζ having the following interrelationship outside its equivalence
class: ~ξ 6= ~ζ for all y ∈ [~γ]c. Moreover, equation (3.13) does not necessarily mean that for ~γ ′, ~γ∗ ∈
[~γ], ~γ ′ 6= ~γ∗, it holds ~ξ ′ = ~ξ∗. Hence, the vector of unbalanced excesses ~ξ is only equal with the
vector of unbalanced maximum surpluses ~ζ if the corresponding pre-imputation ~γ is drawn from its proper
equivalence class [~γ].
In addition, we write for sake of simplicity that Eij := (1Sji − 1Sij ) ∈ Rn, ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j, and
E0 := −1N ∈ Rn. Notice that 1S is the indicator function or characteristic vector 1S : N 7→ {0, 1}
given by 1S(k) := 1 if k ∈ S, otherwise 1S(k) := 0. Combining these q-column vectors, we can construct
an (n× q)-matrix in Rn×q referred to as E, and which is given by
E := [E1,2, . . . ,En−1,n,E0] ∈ Rn×q . (3.14)
Proposition 3.3 (Quadratic Function). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game with indirect function π, then an arbitrary
vector ~γ in the domain of h, i.e. ~γ ∈ domh, induces a quadratic function:
hγ(x) = (1/2) · 〈 x,Qx 〉+ 〈 x,a 〉+ α x ∈ domh, (3.15)
where a is a column vector of coefficients, α is a scalar andQ is a symmetric (n× n)-matrix with integer
coefficients taken from the interval [−n · (n− 1), n · (n− 1)].
Proof. The proof is given in Meinhardt (2013, pp. 66-68).
By the above discussion, the objective function h and the quadratic as well as convex function hγ
of type (3.15) coincide on the payoff set [~γ] (cf. Meinhardt (2013, Lemma 6.2.2)). However, on the
complement [~γ]c it holds h 6= hγ . Moreover, in view of Meinhardt (2013, Proposition 6.2.2) function h is
composed of a finite family of quadratic and convex functions of type (3.15).
Proposition 3.4 (Least Squares). A quadratic function hγ given by equation (3.15) is equivalent to
〈 ~α+E⊤ x, ~α+E⊤ x 〉 = ‖ ~α+E⊤ x ‖2. (3.16)
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Therefore, the matrix Q ∈ Rn2 can also be expressed as Q = 2 · E E⊤, and the column vector a as
2 ·E ~α ∈ Rn. Finally, the scalar α is given by ‖~α‖2, where E ∈ Rn×q,E⊤ ∈ Rq×n and ~α ∈ Rq.
Proof. The proof can be found in Meinhardt (2013, pp. 70-71).
Realize that the transpose of a vector or a matrix is denoted by the symbols x⊤, andQ⊤ respectively.
Lemma 3.2 (Meinhardt (2013)). Let x, ~γ ∈ domh,x = ~γ + z and let ~γ induces the matrices E ∈
Rn×q,E⊤ ∈ Rq×n determined by formula (3.14), and ~α, ~ξ ∈ Rq as in equation (3.12). If x ∈ M(hγ),
then
1. −E⊤ x = P ~α.
2. E⊤ ~γ = P (~ξ − ~α) = (~ξ − ~α).
3. −E⊤ z = P ~ξ.
In addition, let q :=
(
n
2
)
+1. The matrixP ∈ Rq2 is either equal to 2 ·E⊤Q−1E, if the matrixQ ∈ Rn2 is
non-singular, or it is equal to 2 ·E⊤Q†E, if the matrixQ is singular. Furthermore, it holds for the matrix
P that P 6= Iq and rankP ≤ n.
Proof. The proof is given in Meinhardt (2013, pp. 80-81).
Notice that Q† is the Moore-Penrose or pseudo-inverse matrix of matrix Q, if matrix Q is singular.
This matrix is unique according to the following properties: (1) general condition, i.e. QQ†Q = Q, (2)
reflexive, i.e. Q†QQ† = Q†, (3) normalized, i.e. (QQ†)⊤ = Q†Q, and finally (4) reversed normalized,
i.e. (Q†Q)⊤ = QQ†.
Proposition 3.5 (Orthogonal Projection Operator). Matrix P is idempotent and self-adjoint, i.e. P is an
orthogonal projection operator.
Proof. The proof can be found in Meinhardt (2013, p. 86).
Lemma 3.3 (Meinhardt (2013).). Let E be a subspace of Rq with basis {e1, . . . , em} derived from the lin-
ear independent vectors of matrix E⊤ having rankm, withm ≤ n, and let {w1, . . . ,wq−m} be a basis of
W := E⊥. In addition, define matrixE⊤ := [e1, . . . , em] ∈ Rq×m, and matrixW⊤ := [w1, . . . ,wq−m] ∈
Rq×(q−m), then for any ~β ∈ Rq it holds
1. ~β = [E⊤ W⊤] · c where c ∈ Rq is a coefficient vector, and
2. the matrix [E⊤ W⊤] ∈ Rq×q is invertible, that is, we have
[E⊤ W⊤]−1 =
[
(E E⊤)−1E
(W W⊤)−1W
]
.
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013, pp. 90-91).
Notice that E can be interpreted as indicating a vector subspace of balanced excesses. A pre-imputation
will be mapped into its proper vector subspace of balanced excesses E, i.e. the vector subspace induced
by the pre-imputation. However, the corresponding vector of unbalanced excesses generated by this pre-
imputation is an element of this vector subspace of balanced excesses, if the pre-imputation is also a
pre-kernel point. Hence, the vector of balanced excesses coincides with the vector of balanced maximum
surpluses. This is a consequence of Lemma 3.2 or see Proposition 8.4.1 in Meinhardt (2013). Otherwise,
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this vector of unbalanced excesses will be mapped by the orthogonal projectionP on E. More information
about the properties of this kind of vector subspace can be found in Meinhardt (2013, pp. 87-113 and 138-
168).
Proposition 3.6 (Positive General Linear Group). Let {e1, . . . , em} as well as {e11, . . . , e1m} be two or-
dered bases of the subspace E derived from the payoff sets [~γ] and [~γ1], respectively. In addition, define the
associated basis matrices E⊤, E⊤1 ∈ Rq×m as in Lemma 3.3, then the unique transition matrix X ∈ Rm
2
such that E⊤1 = E
⊤X is given, is an element of the positive general linear group, that is X ∈ GL+(m).
Proof. The proof can be found in Meinhardt (2013, p. 101).
Proposition 3.6 denotes two payoff sets [~γ] and [~γ1] as equivalent, if there exists a transition matrix X
from the positive general linear group, that is X ∈ GL+(m), such that E⊤1 = E⊤X is in force. Notice
that the transition matrix X must be unique (cf. Meinhardt (2013, p. 102)). The underlying group action
(cf. Meinhardt (2013, Corollary 6.6.1)) can be interpreted that a bargaining situation is transformed into
an equivalent bargaining situation. For a thorough discussion of a group action onto the set of all ordered
bases, the interested reader should consult Meinhardt (2013, Sect. 6.6).
The vector space Rq is an orthogonal decomposition by the subspaces E and NE. We denote in the
sequel a basis of the orthogonal complement of space E by {w1, . . . ,wq−m}. This subspace of Rq is
identified by W := NE = E
⊥. In addition, we have Pwk = 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , q −m}. Thus, we can
obtain the following corollary
Corollary 3.2 (Meinhardt (2013)). If ~γ induces the matrices E ∈ Rn×q,E⊤ ∈ Rq×n determined by
formula (3.14), then with respect to the Euclidean inner product, getting
1. Rq = E⊕W = E⊕ E⊥.
A consequence of the orthogonal projection method presented by the next theorem and corollary is
that every payoff vector belonging to the intersection of the minimum set of function hγ and its payoff
equivalence class [~γ] is a pre-kernel element. This due to hγ = h on [~γ].
Theorem 3.2 (Orthogonal Projection Method). Let ~γk ∈ [~γ] for k = 1, 2, 3. If ~γ2 ∈ M(hγ) and ~γk /∈
M(hγ) for k = 1, 3, then ~ζ2 = ~ξ2 = 0, and consequently ~γ2 ∈ PK(v).
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013, pp. 109-111).
Corollary 3.3 (Meinhardt (2013)). Let be [~γ] an equivalence class of dimension 3 ≤ m ≤ n, and x ∈
M(hγ) ∩ [~γ], then ~α = P ~α, and consequently x ∈ PK(v).
PK(N, v) =
⋃
k∈J′
M(hγk , [~γk]). (3.17)
where J′ is a finite index set such that J′ := {k ∈ J | g(~γk) = 0}. In addition, g(~γk) = 0 is the minimum
value of a minimization problem under constraints of function hγk over the closed payoff set [~γk]. The
solution sets M(hγk , [~γk]) are convex. Taking the finite union of convex sets gives us a non-convex set if
| J′ | ≥ 2. Hence, the pre-kernel set is generically a non-convex set. For the class of convex games and
three person games we have | J′ | = 1, which implies that the per-kernel must be a singleton. From these
ingredients we are able to design a method to compute an element of the pre-kernel.
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Now we are in the position to provide an algorithm to single out a pre-kernel point. That is, given a
TU game 〈N, v〉 with indirect function π and objective function h of type (3.3) on the domain domh, the
method described below generates a sequence of payoff vectors on domh that converges under regime of
orthogonal projection to a pre-kernel point.
To this end, we consider a mapping that sends a point ~γ to a point ~γ◦ ∈M(h~γ) through
Γ(~γ) := −
(
Q† a
)
(~γ) = −
(
Q†~γ a~γ
)
= ~γ◦ ∈M(h~γ) ∀~γ ∈ Rn, (3.18)
where Q~γ and a~γ are the matrix and the column vector induced by vector ~γ, respectively. Notice that
matrix Q†~γ is the pseudo-inverse of matrix Q~γ . In addition, the set M(h~γ) is the solution set of function
h~γ . Under a regime of orthogonal projection this mapping induces a cycle free method to evaluate a pre-
kernel point for any class of TU games. We restate here Algorithm 8.1.1 of Meinhardt (2013) in a more
succinctly written form through Method 3.1.
Algorithm 3.1: Procedure to seek for a Pre-Kernel Element
Data: Arbitrary TU Game 〈N, v 〉, and a payoff vector ~γ0 ∈ R
n.
Result: A payoff vector s.t. ~γk+1 ∈ PK(N, v).
begin
0 k ←− 0, S(~γ−1) ←− ∅
1 Select an arbitrary starting point ~γ0
if ~γ0 /∈ PK(N, v) then Continue
else Stop
2 Determine S(~γ0)
if S(~γ0) 6= S(~γ−1) then Continue
else Stop
repeat
3 if S(~γk) 6= ∅ then Continue
else Stop
4 Compute Ek and ~αk from S(~γk) and v
5 DetermineQk and ak from Ek and ~αk
6 Calculate by Formula (3.18) x
7 k ←− k + 1
8 ~γk+1 ←− x
9 Determine S(~γk+1)
until S(~γk+1) = S(~γk)
end
Meinhardt (2013, Theorem 8.1.2) establishes that this iterative procedure converges toward a pre-kernel
point. In view of Meinhardt (2013, Theorem 9.1.2) we even know that at most
(
n
2
) − 1-iteration steps
are sufficient to successfully terminate the search process. However, we have some empirical evidence
that generically at most n + 1-iteration steps are needed to determine an element from the pre-kernel set
(cf. Meinhardt (2013, Appendix A)). This method has also been proven to be useful in finding a N-shaped
pre-kernel (cf. Meinhardt (2014)).
Example 3.1. To illustrate how the algorithm works, we introduce a minimum cost spanning tree game.
The player set given by N = {1, 2, 3} represents the users of a common good provided by a common
supplier 0. Then the distribution system consists of links among members N0 = {0} ∪ N . The costs
associated to buildup the links is given by the following cost matrix
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C =


0 1 3 5
1 0 1 2
3 1 0 3
5 2 3 0

 , (3.19)
where each entry denotes the cost of constructing the link {i, j}. For a more thorough investigation of
minimum cost spanning tree games we refer to Curiel (1997). In the next step, let us define a savings game
by
v(S) :=
∑
k∈S
c({k})− c(S) ∀ S ⊆ N. (3.20)
From the cost matrix (3.19), we derive a minimum cost spanning tree game from which a savings game
is obtained through formula (3.20). The derived minimum cost spanning tree and savings game are given
by Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: MCST and Savings Game
Game {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
c 1 3 5 2 3 6 4
va,b,c 0 0 0 2 3 2 5
a Kernel: (2, 1, 2)
b Nucleolus: (2, 1, 2)
c Shapley Value: (11/6, 4/3, 11/6)
As a starting point we focus on the pre-selected efficient payoff vector y0 = (−1, 2, 3)⊤ to see of how
we can determine a per-kernel point by means of Algorithm 3.1 for our specific savings game example.
From the vector y0, we get the excess vector exc(y0) = (0, 1,−2,−3, 1, 1,−3, 1).
In the next step, we look on the maximum surpluses for all pair of players. Recall that for any pair of
players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, the maximum surplus of player i over player j with respect to any pre-imputation
x is given by the maximum excess at x over the set of coalitions containing player i but not player j, thus
sij(x, v) := max
S∈Gij
ev(S,x) where Gij := {S | i ∈ S and j /∈ S}.
The expression sij(x, v) describes the maximum amount at the pre-imputation x that player i can gain
without the cooperation of player j.
From this excess vector exc(y0)we get now the subsequent set of lexicographically smallest coalitions
for each pair of players:
S(y0) = {{1}, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}, {3}, {1, 3}}
whereas the order of the pairs of players in S(y0) is given by
{(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 1), (2, 3), (3, 1), (3, 2)}.
For instance, for the pair of players (1, 2), we find out these coalitions that support the claim of player
1 without counting on the cooperation of player 2; these are the coalitions {{1}, {1, 3}} having excess
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(1, 1). We see here that both coalitions have maximum surplus. This set is not unique, we determine the
coalitions that have smallest cardinality, which is {1}. This set is unique and through this set we have also
determined the coalition that has lexicographical minimum. To observe how we have to proceed if this set
is not unique, let us assume that n = 4, then the set of coalitions supporting player 1 without counting on
the cooperation of player 2 is {{1}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 3, 4}}. Moreover, let us assume that the coalitions
{{1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 3, 4}} have maximum surpluses, then the smallest cardinality is 2 and we single out
the coalitions {{1, 3}, {1, 4} and taking finally the lexicographical minimum, which is {1, 3}.
For the reverse pair (2, 1) we find out that coalition {2} supports best the claim of player 2 without
taking into account the cooperation of player 1. Proceeding in the same way for the remaining pairs,
then we derive a matrix E by Eij = 1Sji − 1Sij for each i, j ∈ N, i < j, and E0 = 1N . Notice that
1S : N 7→ {0, 1} is the characteristic vector given by 1S(k) := 1 if k ∈ S, otherwise 1S(k) := 0. Then
matrix E is defined by
E := [E1,2, . . . ,E2,3,E0] ∈ R3×4 .
We realize that vector E1,2 is given by (0, 1, 0)
⊤ − (1, 0, 0)⊤ = (−1, 1, 0)⊤ and E0 = (1, 1, 1)⊤.
Proceeding in an analogous way for the remaining pair of players (1, 3) and (2, 3), matrix E is quantified
by
E =

−1 −1 0 11 0 −1 1
0 1 1 1

 .
A column vector a can be obtained by 2 · E ~α ∈ Rn whereas the vector ~α is given by αij :=
(v(Sji) − v(Sij)) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ N, i < j, and α0 := v(N). Therefore, vector ~α is given by
(0, 0, 1, 5)⊤.
From this matrix, we construct matrixQ by 2 ·E E⊤, inserting its numbers, matrixQ is specified by
Q =

6 0 00 6 0
0 0 6

 .
The column vector a is given by a = (10, 8, 12)⊤.
Solving this system of linear equations Q x − a = 0, or alternatively E⊤ x − ~α = 0, we get as a
solution y1 = (5/3, 4/3, 2)
⊤. The corresponding excess vector is given through
exc(y1) = (0,−5/3,−4/3,−2,−1,−2/3,−4/3, 0).
We observe that the maximum surpluses are not balanced. Hence, we need at least an additional iteration
step to complete.
For the second iteration step we use the vector y1 = (5/3, 4/3, 2)
⊤ while applying the procedure from
above to get matrix E by
E =

−1 −1 0 11 0 −1 1
−1 1 1 1

 .
with ~α is given by (−3, 0, 1, 5)⊤. Constructing again matrixQ through
16
On the Replication of the Pre-Kernel and Related Solutions
Q =

6 0 20 6 −2
2 −2 8

 .
The column vector a is given by a = (16, 2, 18)⊤. Solving this system of linear equations Q x− a = 0,
we get as a solution y2 = (2, 1, 2)
⊤. The corresponding excess vector is given through
exc(y2) = (0,−2,−1,−2,−1,−1,−1, 0).
We can check out that the maximum surpluses are balanced, hence the vector y2 = (2, 1, 2)
⊤ is a
pre-kernel element of the game. Notice that in this specific case, we needed only two iteration steps
to complete. This is the theoretical expected upper bound of iteration steps, since by Theorem 9.2.1
of Meinhardt (2013, p. 222), we have
(
3
2
)− 1 = 3− 1 = 2. #
4 THE SINGLE-VALUEDNESS OF THE PRE-KERNEL
In this section we apply results and techniques employed in the work of Meinhardt (2013). Namely, we
prove in a first step that the linear mapping of a pre-kernel element into a specific vector subspace of
balanced excesses is a singleton. Secondly, that there cannot exist a different and non-transversal vector
subspace of balanced excesses in which a linear transformation of a pre-kernel element can be mapped.
This enables us to study the single-valuedness of the pre-kernel solution of a related TU game derived
from a pre-kernel element of a default game.
For conducting this line of investigation some additional concepts are needed. In a first step we in-
troduce the definition of a unanimity game, which is indicated as: uT (S) := 1, if T ⊆ S, otherwise
uT (S) := 0, whereas T ⊆ N,T 6= ∅. The collection of all unanimity games forms a unanimity/game
basis. A formula to express the coordinates of this basis is given by
v =
∑
T⊂N,
T 6=∅
λvT uT ⇐⇒ λvT =
∑
S⊂T,
S 6=∅
(−1)t−s · v(S),
if 〈N, v〉, where |S| = s, and |T | = t. A coordinate λvT is said to be an unanimity coordinate of game
〈N, v〉, and vector λv is called the unanimity coordinates of game 〈N, v〉. Notice that we assume here that
the game is defined in R2
n−1 rather than R2
n
, since we want to write for sake of convenience the game
basis in matrix form without a column and row of zeros. Thus we write
v =
∑
T⊂N,
T 6=∅
λvT uT = [u{1}, . . . ,u{N}]λ
v = U λv
where the unanimity basis U is in Rp
′×p′ with p′ = 2n − 1. In addition, define the unity games (Dirac
games) 1T for all T ⊆ N as: 1T (S) := 1, if T = S, otherwise 1T (S) := 0.
In the next step, we select a payoff vector ~γ, which also determines its payoff set as a representative
by [~γ]. With regard to Proposition 3.2, this vector induces in addition a set of lexicographically smallest
most effective coalitions indicated by S(~γ). Implying that we get the configuration ~α by the q-coordinates
αij := (v(Sij) − v(Sji)) ∈ R for all i, j ∈ N, i < j, and α0 := v(N). Furthermore, we can also define
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a set of vectors as the differences of unity games w.r.t. the set of lexicographically smallest most effective
coalitions, which is given by
vij := 1
Sij − 1Sji for Sij , Sji ∈ S(~γ) and v0 := 1N , (4.1)
whereas vij ,v0 ∈ Rp′ for all i, j ∈ N, i < j. With these column vectors, we can identify matrix
V := [v1,2, . . . ,vn−1,n,v0] ∈ Rp′×q. Then we obtain ~α = V⊤ v with v ∈ Rp′ due to the removed empty
set. Moreover, by the measure y(S) :=
∑
k∈S yk for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , we extend every payoff vector y
to a vector y ∈ Rp′ , and define the excess vector at y by ey := v − y ∈ Rp′ , then we get ~ξy = V⊤ ey.
From matrix V⊤, we can also derive an orthogonal projection PV specified by V
⊤ (V⊤)† ∈ Rq×q such
that Rq = V ⊕ V⊥ is valid, i.e. the rows of matrix V⊤ are a spanning system of the vector subspace
V ⊆ Rq×q, thus V := span{v⊤1,2, . . . ,v⊤n−1,n,v⊤0 }. Vector subspace V reflects the power of the set of
lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions. In contrast, vector subspace E reflects the ascribed
unbalancedness in the coalition power w.r.t. the bilateral bargaining situation obtained at ~γ through S(~γ).
The next results show how these vector subspaces are intertwined.
Lemma 4.1 (Meinhardt (2013)). Let E⊤ ∈ Rq×n be defined as in Equation (3.14), V⊤ ∈ Rq×p′ as by
Equation (4.1), then there exists a matrixZ⊤ ∈ Rp′×n such thatE⊤ = V⊤ Z⊤ if, and only if,RE⊤ ⊆ RV⊤ ,
that is, E ⊆ V.
Proof. The proof is given in Meinhardt (2013, p. 141).
Notice that the minimal rank of matrix V⊤ is bounded by E⊤ which is equal to m < n with the
consequence that we get in this case V = E. However, the maximal rank is equal to q, and then V = Rq
(cf. Meinhardt (2013, Corollary 7.4.1)).
Lemma 4.2 (Meinhardt (2013)). Let ~α, ~ξ ∈ Rq as in Equation (3.12), then the following relations are
satisfied on the vector space V:
1. PV ~α = ~α ∈ V
2. PV ~ξ = ~ξ ∈ V
3. PV (~ξ − ~α) = (~ξ − ~α) ∈ V
4. PVE
⊤ = PE⊤ = E⊤, hence E ⊆ V
5. EPV = EP = E, hence RE ⊆ V.
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2013, p. 142).
It was worked out by Meinhardt (2013, Sect. 7.6) that a pre-kernel element of a specific game can
be replicated as a pre-kernel element of a related game whenever the non-empty interior property of the
payoff set, in which the pre-kernel element of default game is located, is satisfied. In this case, a full
dimensional ellipsoid can be inscribed from which some bounds can be specified within the game pa-
rameter can be varied without destroying the pre-kernel properties of the payoff vector of the default
game. These bounds specify a redistribution of the bargaining power among coalitions while supporting
the selected pre-imputation still as a pre-kernel point. Although the values of the maximum excesses have
been changed by the parameter variation, the set of lexicographically smallest most significant coalitions
remains unaffected.
Lemma 4.3 (Meinhardt (2013)). If x ∈M(hvγ), then x ∈M(hv
µ
γ ) for all µ ∈ R, where vµ := U(λv+µ∆)
and 0 6= ∆ ∈ NW = {∆ ∈ Rp ′ |W∆ = 0}, whereW := V⊤U ∈ Rq×p ′ .
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Proof. Let x be a minimizer of function hvγ under game v, then x remains a minimizer for a function h
vµ
γ
induced by game vµ whenever Qx = −2E ~α = −a remains valid. Since the payoff vector has induced
the matrices Q,E and matrix V defined by [v1,2, . . . ,vn−1,n,v0], where the vectors are defined as by
formula (4.1). We simply have to prove that the configuration ~α remains invariant against an appropriate
change in the game parameter. Observing that matrix W has a rank equal to or smaller than q =
(
n
2
)
+ 1,
say m ≤ q, then the null space of matrix W has rank of p′ −m, thus NW 6= {∅}. But then exists some
0 6= ∆ ∈ Rp′ s.t. ∆ ∈ NW and vµ = U(λv + µ∆) for µ ∈ R\{0}, getting
W λv
µ
= W (λv + µ∆) = V⊤ (v + µv∆) = V⊤ v = ~α,
whereas W∆ = V⊤ v∆ = 0 with v∆ := U∆. This argument proves that the configuration ~α remains
invariant against a change in the game parameter space by v∆ 6= 0. This implies that the payoff vector x
is also a minimizer for function hv
µ
γ under game v
µ.
Lemma 4.4 (Meinhardt (2013)). If [~γ] has non-empty interior and x ∈ PK(v) ⊂ [~γ], then there exists
some critical bounds given by
δεij(x) =
±√c¯
‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖ 6= 0 ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, (4.2)
with c¯ > 0 and ‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖ > 0.
Proof. Define a set ε := {y |hvγ(y) ≤ c¯} ⊂ [~γ], whereas hvγ(y) = (1/2) · 〈 y,Qy 〉 + 〈 y,a 〉 + α.
By assumption the payoff set [~γ] has non-empty interior, we can say that ε is the ellipsoid of maximum
volume obtained by Formula (3.15) that lies inside of the convex payoff set [~γ]. This ellipsoid must have a
strictly positive volume, since the payoff equivalence class [~γ] has non-empty interior, hence we conclude
that c¯ > 0. Of course, the set ε is a convex subset of the convex set [~γ], therefore hv = hvγ on ε. Moreover,
the solution set M(hvγ) is a subset of the ellipsoid ε, which is the smallest non-empty ellipsoid of the
form (3.15), i.e., it is its center in view of Theorem 3.2. By our supposition PK(v) ⊂ [~γ], we conclude
that M(hv) = M(hvγ) = PK(v) must be satisfied. In the next step similar to Maschler et al. (1979), we
define some critical numbers δεij(x) ∈ R s.t.
δεij(x) := max {δ ∈ R |x i,j,δ = x− δ 1i + δ 1j ∈ ε} ∀ i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. (4.3)
That is, the number δεij(x) is the maximum amount that can be transferred from i to j while remaining in
the ellipsoid ε. This number is well defined for convex sets having non-empty interior.
In addition, observe that x i,j,δ
ε
= x− δεij(x)1i+ δεij(x)1j is a unique boundary point of the ellipsoid
ε of type (3.15) with maximum volume. Having specified by the point x i,j,δ
ε
a boundary point, getting
hv(x i,j,δ
ε
) = hvγ(x
i,j,δε) = c¯ > 0⇐⇒
‖E⊤ x i,j,δε + ~α‖2 = c¯⇐⇒ ‖E⊤ x+ ~α+ δεij(x)E⊤(1j − 1i)‖2 = c¯⇐⇒
‖E⊤ x+ ~α‖2 + 2 · δεij(x) 〈E⊤ x+ ~α,E⊤(1j − 1i) 〉+ (δεij(x))2 ‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖2 = c¯⇐⇒
(δεij(x))
2 ‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖2 = c¯ ∀ i, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
The last conclusion follows, since by assumption we have x ∈ PK(v), which is equivalent to hv(x) =
hvγ(x) = 0, and therefore we obtain E
⊤ x + ~α = 0. In addition, the volume of the ellipsoid ε is strictly
positive such that c¯ > 0, this result implies that (δεij(x))
2 as well as ‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖2 must also be strictly
positive. Therefore, we get finally (4.2).
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Theorem 4.1 (Meinhardt (2013)). If [~γ] has non-empty interior and x ∈ PK(v) ⊂ [~γ], then x ∈ PK(vµ)
for all µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ , where vµ = v + µ · v∆ ∈ Rp′ , µ ∈ R
C := min
i,j∈N,i 6=j
{ ±
√
c¯
‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖

}
, (4.4)
and 0 6= ∆ ∈ NW = {∆ ∈ Rp ′ |W∆ = 0} with matrixW := V⊤U.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4 x i,j,δ
ε ∈ ε ⊂ [~γ], is a unique boundary point of the ellipsoid ε of type (3.15)
with maximum volume. We conclude that either (1) sij(x
i,j,δε) = sij(x) + δ
ε
ij(x) if S ∈ Gij , or (2)
sji(x
i,j,δε) = sji(x) − δεij(x) if S ∈ Gji, or otherwise (3) sij(x i,j,δ
ε
) = sij(x) is satisfied. Moreover,
let v, vµ, v∆ ∈ Rp′ and recall that vµ = U(λv + µ∆) with 0 6= ∆ ∈ NW. Then it holds vµ(S) =
v(S) + µ · v∆(S) for all S ∈ 2n\{∅}. In the next step, extend the pre-kernel element x to a vector x by
the measure x(S) :=
∑
k∈S xk for all S ∈ 2n\{∅}, then define the excess vector by e := v − x. Due to
these definitions, we obtain for ~ξ v
µ
at x:
~ξ v
µ
= V⊤ eµ = V⊤ (vµ − x) = V⊤ (v − x+ µ · v∆) = V⊤ (v − x) = V⊤ e = ~ξ = 0.
By Lemma 4.3, the system of excesses remains balanced for all µ ∈ R. However, the system of maximum
surpluses remains invariant on a hypercube specified by the critical values of the ellipsoid ε. Thus, for
appropriate values of µ the expression µ·v∆(S) belongs to the non-empty interval [−C,C] for S ∈ 2n\{∅}.
This interval specifies the range in which the game parameter can vary without having any impact on the
set of most effective coalition given by S(x). Thus, the coalitions S(x) still have maximum surpluses for
games defined by vµ = U(λv + µ∆) for all µU∆ = µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ . Hence the pre-kernel solution x
is invariant against a change in the hypercube [−C,C]p′ . The conclusion follows.
Meinhardt (2013, Sec. 7.6) has shown by some examples that the specified bounds by Theorem 4.1
are not tight, in the sense that pre-kernel points belonging to the relative interior of a payoff set can also
be the object of a replication. However, pre-kernel elements which are located on the relative boundary
of a payoff set are probably not replicable. Therefore, there must exist a more general rule to reproduce a
pre-kernel element for a related game vµ.
In the course of our discussion, we establish that the single pre-kernel element of a default game
which is an interior point of a payoff set is also the singleton pre-kernel of the derived related games. In
a first step, we show that there exists a unique linear transformation of the pre-kernel point of a related
game into the vector subspace of balanced excesses E. This means, there is no other pre-kernel element
in a payoff equivalence class that belongs to the same set of ordered bases, i.e. reflecting an equivalent
bargaining situation with a division of the proceeds of mutual cooperation in accordance with the pre-
kernel solution. Secondly, we prove that there can not exist any other vector subspace of balanced excesses
E1 non-transversal to E in which a pre-kernel vector can be mapped by a linear transformation. That is,
there exists no other non-equivalent payoff set in which an other pre-kernel point can be located.
Lemma 4.5 (Meinhardt (2013)). Let ~γ induces matrix E, then
(E⊤)† = 2 ·Q†E ∈ Rn×q.
Proof. Remind from Lemma 3.2 that P = 2 ·E⊤Q†E holds. In addition, note that we have the following
relationQ†Q = (E⊤)†E⊤ which is an orthogonal projection onto RE. Then obtaining
2 ·Q†E = 2 ·Q†QQ†E = 2 · (E⊤)†E⊤Q†E
= (E⊤)†(2 ·E⊤Q†E) = (E⊤)†P = (E⊤)†.
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The last equality follows from Lemma 4.2. This argument terminates the proof.
Notice that in the sequel SO(n) denotes the special orthogonal group, whereas GL+(n) denotes the
positive general linear group (cf. Meinhardt (2013, pp. 99-109)).
Proposition 4.1. Let E⊤1 = E
⊤X withX ∈ SO(n), that is [~γ] ∼ [~γ1]. In addition, assume that the payoff
equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game 〈N, v 〉 has non-empty interior such that {x} = PK(v) ⊂ [~γ]
is satisfied, then there exists no other pre-kernel element in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] for a related TU
game 〈N, vµ 〉, where vµ = v + µ · v∆ ∈ Rp′ , as defined by Lemma 4.3.
Proof. By the way of contradiction suppose that x,y ∈ PK(vµ) with y ∈ [~γ1] is valid. Then we get
hv
µ
(x) = hv
µ
γ (x) = ‖E⊤ x+ ~α‖2 = 0 and hv
µ
(y) = hv
µ
γ1 (y) = ‖E⊤1 y + ~α1‖2 = 0,
implying that
P ~α = ~α ∈ E and P ~α1 = ~α1 ∈ E. (4.5)
Moreover, we have E⊤1 = E
⊤X with X ∈ SO(n), then E ⊆ V ∩ V1 in accordance with Lemma 7.4.1
by Meinhardt (2013). Now assume that ~α1 = V
⊤
1 v
µ holds with V1 ⊆ V. The latter supposition implies
V
⊤
1 = PVV
⊤
1 , since for every
~β ∈ V we get ~β = PV ~β (cf. Remark 6.5.1 Meinhardt (2013)). According
to V1 ⊆ V it also holds NW1 ⊇ NW. Our hypothesis y ∈ PK(vµ) implies
0 = E⊤1 y + ~α1 = V
⊤
1 Z
⊤ y +V⊤1 v
µ = V⊤1 Z
⊤ y +V⊤1 (v + µ · v∆) = V⊤1 (v − y),
whereas the vector of measures y is expressed by y = −Z⊤ y (cf. Meinhardt (2013, p. 141)). The result
V
⊤
1 (v−y) = 0 yields to y ∈ PK(v), which is a contradiction. Therefore, we conclude that V ⊂ V1 must
be satisfied.
In addition, from ~α1 = V
⊤
1 v
µ we obtain PV ~α1 = V
⊤ (V⊤)†V⊤1 v
µ 6= V⊤1 vµ = ~α1 in accordance
with PVV
⊤
1 6= V⊤1 , in fact, it holds V ⊂ V1. Thus, we have PV ~α1 /∈ V contradicting that PV ~α1 = ~α1 ∈
E ⊆ V ⊂ V1 holds true. From this, we conclude that ~α1 = V⊤ vµ must be in force.
Furthermore, from (4.5) we have
P ~α− ~α = P ~α1 − ~α1 = 0 ∈ E⇐⇒ P (~α− ~α1) = (~α− ~α1) ∈ E.
Therefore, obtaining the equivalent expression
E⊤ (X y − x) = (~α− ~α1) = V⊤ v −V⊤ (v + µ · v∆) = 0,
then x = X y, since matrix E⊤ has full rank due to {x} = PK(v). Furthermore, notice that
〈x,y 〉 = 〈 (E⊤)† ~α, (E⊤1 )† ~α1 〉 = 〈 (E⊤)† ~α,X−1 (E⊤)† ~α 〉 = 〈 2Q†E ~α, 2X−1Q†E ~α 〉 6= 0
Matrix E⊤ has full rank, and Q is symmetric and positive definite, hence Q† = Q−1, and the above
expression can equivalently be written as
〈Q† a, X−1Q† a 〉 = 〈Q−1 a, X−1Q−1 a 〉 = 〈a,QX−1Q−1 a 〉
= 〈a, X1a 〉 = 〈a,a1 〉 6= 0,
(4.6)
while using a = 2E ~α from Proposition 3.4, and with similar matrix X1 = QX
−1Q−1 as well as
a1 = X1 a. According to E
⊤
1 = E
⊤X with X ∈ SO(n), we can write X = Q−1(2EE⊤1 ). But then
X1 = QX
−1Q−1 = Q (2EE⊤1 )
−1.
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Since we have X ∈ SO(n), it holds X−1 = X⊤ implying that
X⊤1 = X
−1 = (2EE⊤1 )
−1Q = (2EE⊤1 )Q
−1 = X⊤ = X−11 ,
which induces X = Q−1 (2EE⊤1 ) = Q (2EE
⊤
1 )
−1 = X1. Now, observe
X1 = QX
−1Q−1 = QX⊤Q−1 = Q (2EE⊤1 )Q
−1Q−1
= Q (2EE⊤X)Q−2 = Q2XQ−2,
hence, we can conclude that X = I implying X1 = I as well. We infer that x = y contradicting the
assumption x 6= y due to x ∈ [~γ], and y ∈ [~γ1]. With this argument we are done.
Proposition 4.2. Impose the same conditions as under Proposition 4.1 with the exception that X ∈
GL+(n), then there exists no other pre-kernel element in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] for a related TU
game 〈N, vµ 〉.
Proof. By the proof of Proposition 4.1 the system of linear equations E⊤ (X y − x) = 0 is consistent,
then we get x = X y by the full rank of matrix E⊤. By Equation 4.6 we obtain similar matrix X1 =
QX−1Q−1, hence the matrix X1 is in the same orbit (conjugacy class) as matrix X
−1, this implies that
E⊤ = E⊤1 X
−1 = E⊤1 X1 must be in force. But then E
⊤ = E⊤XX1, which requires that XX1 = I
must be satisfied in view of the uniqueness of the transition matrix X ∈ GL+(m) (cf. Meinhardt (2013,
p. 102)). In addition, we have a1 = X1 a as well as a1 = 2E1 ~α = X a. Therefore, we obtain
X a1 = a = X
2 a. From this we draw the conclusion in connection with the uniqueness of the transition
matrix X that X = I is valid. Hence, x = y as required.
Proposition 4.3. Assume [~γ] ≁ [~γ1], and that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game
〈N, v 〉 has non-empty interior such that {x} = PK(v) ⊂ [~γ] is satisfied, then there exists no other pre-
kernel element in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] for a related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉, where vµ = v + µ · v∆ ∈
Rp
′
, as defined by Lemma 4.3.
Proof. We have to establish that there is no other element y ∈ PK(vµ) such that y ∈ [~γ1] is valid, whereas
y /∈ PK(v) in accordance with the single-valuedness of the pre-kernel for game v. In view of Theorem 4.1
the pre-kernel {x} = PK(v) of game 〈N, v 〉 is also a pre-kernel element of the related game 〈N, vµ 〉,
i.e. x ∈ PK(vµ) with x ∈ [~γ] due to Corollary 3.2.
Extend the payoff element y to a vector y by the measure y(S) :=
∑
k∈S yk for all S ∈ 2n\{∅}, then
define the excess vector by eµ := vµ − y. Moreover, compute the vector of unbalanced excesses ~ξ vµ at y
for game vµ by V⊤1 e
µ. This vector is also the vector of unbalanced maximum surpluses, since y ∈ [~γ1],
and therefore h v
µ
= h v
µ
γ1 on [~γ1] in view of Lemma 6.2.2 by Meinhardt (2013). Notice that in order to
have a pre-kernel element at y for the related game vµ it must hold ~ξ v
µ
= 0. In addition, by hypothesis
[~γ] ≁ [~γ1], it must hold E
⊤ = V⊤ Z⊤ and E⊤1 = V
⊤
1 Z
⊤ in view of Lemma 4.1, thus E⊤1 6= E⊤X for
allX ∈ GL+(n). This implies that we derive the corresponding matricesW := V⊤U andW1 := V⊤1 U,
respectively.
We have to consider two cases, namely∆ ∈ NW ∩NW1 and ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 .
1. Suppose ∆ ∈ NW ∩NW1 , then we get
~ξ v
µ
= V⊤1 e
µ = V⊤1 (v
µ − y) = V⊤1 (v − y + µ · v∆) = V⊤1 (v − y) = V⊤1 e = ~ξ v 6= 0.
Observe that ~ξ v = V⊤1 (v − y) 6= 0, since vector y ∈ [~γ1] is not a pre-kernel element of game v.
22
On the Replication of the Pre-Kernel and Related Solutions
2. Now suppose ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 , then
~ξ v
µ
= V⊤1 e
µ = V⊤1 (v
µ− y) = V⊤1 (v− y+ µ · v∆) = V⊤1 e+ µ ·V⊤1 v∆ = ~ξ v + µ ·V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0.
Since, we have V⊤1 (v − y) 6= 0 as well as V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0, and V⊤1 v∆ can not be expressed by
−V⊤1 (v−y) in accordance with our hypothesis. To see this, suppose that the vector∆ is expressible
in this way, then it must hold ∆ = − 1µ (W1)† ~ξ v. However, this implies
W∆ = − 1
µ
W (W1)
† ~ξ v = − 1
µ
(V⊤U) (V⊤1 U)
† ~ξ v = − 1
µ
V
⊤ (V⊤1 )
† ~ξ v 6= 0.
This argument terminates the proof.
To complete the single-valuedness investigation, we need to establish that the single pre-kernel element
of the default game also preserves the pre-nucleolus property for the related games, otherwise we can be
sure that there must exist at least a second pre-kernel point for the related game different from the first one.
For doing so, we introduce the following set:
Definition 4.1. For every x ∈ Rn, and ψ ∈ R define the set
Dv(ψ,x) := {S ⊆ N | ev(S,x) ≥ ψ} , (4.7)
and letB = {S1, . . . , Sm} be a collection of non-empty sets ofN . We denote the collectionB as balanced
whenever there exist positive numbers wS for all S ∈ B such that we have
∑
S∈B wS1S = 1N . The
numberswS are called weights for the balanced collectionB. Be reminded that 1S is the indicator function
or characteristic vector 1S : N 7→ {0, 1} given by 1S(k) := 1 if k ∈ S, otherwise 1S(k) := 0.
A characterization of the pre-nucleolus in terms of balanced collections is due to Kohlberg (1971).
Theorem 4.2. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game and let be x ∈ I∗(v). Then x = ν(N, v) if, and only if, for every
ψ ∈ R,Dv(ψ,x) 6= ∅ implies that Dv(ψ,x) is a balanced collection over N.
Theorem 4.3. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a singleton pre-kernel such that {x} = PK(v) ⊂
[~γ], and let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v derived from x, then x = ν∗(N, v µ), whereas the payoff
equivalence class [~γ] has non-empty interior.
Proof. By our hypothesis, x = ν(N, v) is an interior point of an inscribed ellipsoid with maximum
volume ε := {y′ |hvγ(y′) ≤ c¯} ⊂ [~γ], whereas hvγ is of type (3.15) and c¯ > 0 (cf. Lemma 4.4). This
implies by Theorem 4.1 that this point is also a pre-kernel point of game vµ, there is no change in set
of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions S(x) under vµ. The min-max excess value ψ∗
obtained by iteratively solving the LP (6.4-6.7) of Maschler et al. (1979, p. 332) for game v is smaller
than the maximum surpluses derived from S(x), this implies that there exists a ψ¯ ≥ ψ∗ s.t. S(x) ⊆
Dv(ψ¯,x), that is, it satisfies Property I of Kohlberg (1971). Moreover, matrix E⊤ induced from S(x)
has full rank, therefore, the column vectors of matrix E⊤ are a spanning system of Rn. Hence, we get
span {1S |S ∈ S(x)} = Rn, which implies that the corresponding matrix [1S ]S∈S(x) must have rank n,
therefore collection S(x) is balanced. In addition, we can choose the largest ψ ∈ R s.t. ∅ 6= Dv(ψ,x) ⊆
S(x) is valid, which is a balanced set. Furthermore, we have µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ . Since C > 0, the set
Dv(ψ − 2C,x) 6= ∅ is balanced as well. Now observe that ev(S,x) − C ≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) ≤
ev(S,x) + C for all S ⊆ N . This implies Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ S(x) ⊆ Dvµ(ψ − C,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2C,x),
hence, Dv
µ
(ψ − C,x) is balanced. Let c ∈ [−C,C], and from the observation limc↑0 Dvµ(ψ + c,x) =
Dv
µ
(ψ,x) ⊇ Dv(ψ,x), we draw the conclusion x = ν(N, v µ).
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Theorem 4.4. Assume that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game 〈N, v 〉 has non-empty
interior. In addition, assume that game 〈N, v 〉 has a singleton pre-kernel such that {x} = PK(v) ⊂ [~γ]
is satisfied, then the pre-kernel PK(vµ) of a related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉, as defined by Lemma 4.3, consists
of a single point, which is given by {x} = PK(vµ).
Proof. This result follows from Theorems 4.1, 4.3, and Propositions 4.2, 4.3.
REMARK 4.1.
Theorem 4.4 states that an agreement point based on the norms of distributive arbitration of the pre-kernel
remains stable, whenever the parameter change within the characteristic function does not exceed a certain
bound, i.e., the absolute redistribution of bargaining power among the coalitions that materializes by game
vµ is not too large to disturb the relative order of bargaining power between the coalitions. Then the origi-
nal contract based on the pre-kernel element x remains stable, and cannot be obstructed while referring to
the principles of distributive justice related to those. That is to say that the underlying bargaining agenda
must remain stable. This implicates that in case that subjects have agreed upon that their standard of fair-
ness is best reflected by the pre-kernel solution, they have to single out a new bargaining agreement under
this understanding when a variation within the game parameter space changes the underlying negotiation
structure. Changing in this context to another solution like the Shapley value implies that the preferences
over the set of norms of distributive arbitration are not stable. But then any kind of stability analysis must
be obsolete, which must lie at the heart of any economical study (cf., for instance, with Meinhardt (2002,
Chap. 2), Meinhardt (2017)). Furthermore, we observe by this kind of stability analysis that it makes only
sense for solution concepts which exist on every game class. Narrowing the set of solution concepts of any
game theoretical and practical relevance considerably. For a practical application, we refer to Meinhardt
(2018a). ✸
To summarize: by the above consideration we have established a single-valuedness result of the pre-
kernel by conducting the following steps: (1) The linear mapping of a pre-kernel element into a specific
vector subspace of balanced excesses E consists of a single point. (2) There can not exist any other non-
transversal vector subspace of balanced excesses E1 in which a linear transformation of pre-kernel element
can be mapped. (3) The pre-kernel coincides with the pre-nucleolus of the set of related games. This
excludes the possibility that there must exist at least a second pre-kernel point, namely the pre-nucleolus.
Example 4.1. In order to illuminate the foregoing discussion of replicating a pre-kernel element consider
a four person average-convex but non-convex game that is specified by
v(N) = 16, v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = 8,
v({1, 3}) = 4, v({1, 4}) = 1, v({1, 2}) = 16/3, v(S) = 0 otherwise,
with N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Further inspection reveals that this game has a veto-player, who is player one.
Hence, apart from average-convexity, the game is even a veto-rich game, but then the pre-kernel must
coalesce with the pre-nucleolus (cf. Arin and Feltkamp (1997)), whereas its outcome is given by the point:
ν(v) = PK(v) = (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9). Obviously, the set S(ν(v)) = {{2}, {3}, {4}, {1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}}
is balanced, from this set a boundary vector ~b = (4, 32/9, 32/9, 80/9, 12) is obtained by ν(v)(S) for
S ∈ S(ν(v)). Define matrix A by [1S ]S∈S(ν(v)), then the solution of the system Ax = ~b reproduces the
pre-nucleolus. Moreover, this imputation is even an interior point. To see this, select an ǫ > 0 sufficiently
small and let z ∈ R4 s.t. z(N) = 0, then one can establish that S(ν(v) + ǫ z) = S(ν(v)) holds. Thus,
the non-empty interior condition is valid. Hence, by Theorem 4.1 a redistribution of the bargaining power
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among coalitions can be obtained while supporting the imputation (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9) still as a pre-
kernel element for a set of related games. In order to get a null space NW with maximum dimension we
set the parameter µ to 0.9. In this case, the rank of matrix W must be equal to 4, and we could derive at
most 11-linear independent games which replicate the point (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9) as a pre-kernel element.
Theorem 4.4 even states that this point is also the sole pre-kernel point, hence the pre-kernel coincide with
the pre-nucleolus for these games (see Table 4.1).
Furthermore, as it will be established in the forthcoming section, the pre-kernel is stable within a fixed
game setting. However, it is not robust against a change in the bargaining agenda, i.e., against a change
of the figure of argumentation during a bargaining process. That is, shifting the exchange of proposals
from the α-argumentation2 to the γ-argumentation3, for instance, might make a pre-kernel agreement
vulnerable (cf. Meinhardt (2018a)). To observe its stability, we just mention here that the convex hull of
the collection of games {v, . . . , v11} form a set in the game space – the game setting has not changed and
with it not the figure of argumentation during the bargaining process, only the bargaining power of the
coalitions has been changed. Within this convex set, each TU game has exactly the above element as its
sole pre-kernel point. This implies that we have identified a stable bargaining scenario, where a settlement
of an agreement is not problematic while referring to the principles of distributive justice related to the
pre-kernel. The agreement based on these principles remains stable after having varied the parameter set
within the specified range. Therefore, the selected agreement point cannot be obstructed by the principles
of distributive justice related to the pre-kernel within this subset of the game space. The incentive to
cooperate remains valid.
In addition note that none of these 11-linear independent related games is average-convex. Only two
games, namely v1 and v3 are zero-monotonic and super-additive. Nevertheless, all games have a non-
empty core and are semi-convex. The cores of the games have between 16 and 24-vertices, and have
volumes that range from approximately 80 to 127 percent of the default core. TU game v2 has the smallest
and v3 the largest core.
4
Table 4.1: List of Gamesf which possess the same unique Pre-Kernela as v
µ = 0.9
Game {1} {2} {1, 2} {3} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3} {4}
v 0 0 16/3 0 4 0 8 0
v1 18/49 32/95 127/24 -1/24 256/59 4/13 175/22 -1/24
v2 -9/25 21/38 89/16 11/48 231/58 42/71 385/47 11/48
v3 -14/45 -1/40 201/41 -28/65 39/11 -19/44 142/19 -28/65
v4 0 0 16/3 0 159/47 16/33 107/14 0
v5 0 0 16/3 0 149/40 -37/102 497/66 0
v6 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
v7 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
v8 0 0 16/3 0 149/40 -37/102 497/66 0
v9 0 0 16/3 0 149/40 -37/102 497/66 0
v10 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
v11 0 0 16/3 0 4 -5/47 143/19 0
Continued on next page
2In the sense of Aumann (1961).
3In the sense of Hart and Kurz (1983).
4The example can be reproduced while using our MATLAB toolbox MatTuGames 2020b. The results can also be verified with
our Mathematica package TuGames 2020a.
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Table 4.1 – continued from previous page
µ = 0.9
Game {1, 4} {2, 4} {1, 2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} N ACV d ZM e
v 1 0 8 0 8 0 16 Y Y
v1 79/59 4/13 175/22 -4/57 792/95 10/33 16 N Y
v2 57/58 42/71 385/47 4/7 325/38 31/56 16 N N
v3 6/11 -19/44 142/19 -27/47 319/40 -29/55 16 N Y
v4 41/34 -3/46 428/53 7/34 8 14/25 16 N N
v5 203/120 2/41 167/19 -5/24 8 -9/19 16 N N
v6 1 23/29 139/16 0 8 18/31 16 N N
v7 1 -5/47 139/16 0 8 -8/25 16 N N
v8 19/24 2/41 71/9 83/120 8 26/61 16 N N
v9 19/24 2/41 71/9 -5/24 8 -9/19 16 N N
v10 1 -5/47 475/61 0 8 18/31 16 N N
v11 1 -5/47 475/61 0 8 -8/25 16 N N
a Pre-Kernel and Pre-Nucleolus: (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9)
b Modiclus: ς∗(N, v) = (8, 53/12, 37/12, 1/2)
c Shapley Value: φ(N, v) = (247/36, 121/36, 113/36, 95/36)
d ACV: Average-Convex Game
e ZM: Zero-Monotonic Game
f Note: Computation performed with MatTuGames (cf. Meinhardt (2020b)).
To visualize some results, we have plotted the core of game v as a yellow polytope in connection with
the imputation set (skeleton-like triangle), the Shapley value (blue enlarged dot), modiclus (green enlarged
dot; forthcoming in Section 8), and pre-nucleolus (red enlarged dot), which is identical to the nucleolus.
By the figure, we observe that all mentioned point solutions are belonging to the core.5. #
Figure 1: The Imputation Set, Core, Modiclus, Nucleolus, and Shapley value of Game v
5The figures have been generated with the graphical extensions of the Mathematica Package TuGames implemented within
Meinhardt (2020a).
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Different applications of the theorem can be found in Meinhardt (2013, Sec. 7.6) and in Meinhardt
(2018a). The latter reference sets this finding in the context of industrial cooperation (cf. Zhao (2018)),
i.e., cooperative oligopoly games with transferable technologies. In particular, to investigate the stability
of a cartel agreement against a redistribution of the bargaining power among coalitions or the figure of
argumentation.
5 ON THE CONTINUITY OF THE PRE-KERNEL
In the previous section, we have established single-valuedness of the pre-kernel on the set of related games.
Here, we generalize these results while showing that even on the convex hull comprising the default and
related games in the game space, the pre-kernel must be a single point and is identical with the element
specified by the default game. Furthermore, the pre-kernel correspondence restricted on this convex subset
in the game space must be single-valued, and therefore continuous.
Recall that the relevant game space is defined through G(N) := {v ∈ Gn | v(∅) = 0∧ v(N) > 0}, and
Gnµ,v :=
{
vµ ∈ G(N) |µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′
}
.
This set is the translate of a convex set by v, which is also convex and non-empty with dimension p′−m′,
if matrixW has rankm′ ≤ q < p′. Then we can construct a convex set in the game space G(N) by taking
the convex hull of game v and the convex set Gnµ,v, thus
Gnc := conv {v,Gnµ,v}.
Theorem 5.1. The pre-kernel PK(vµ
∗
) of game vµ
∗
belonging to Gnc is a singleton, and is equal to {x} =
PK(v).
Proof. Let be {x} = PK(v) for game v. Take a convex combination of games in Gnc , hence
vµ
∗
=
m∑
k=1
tk ·vµk +tm+1 ·v =
m∑
k=1
tk ·(v+µ ·v∆k )+tm+1 ·v = v+µ
m∑
k=1
tk ·v∆k +µ tm+1 ·0 = v+µ ·v∆
∗
,
with v∆
∗
:=
∑m
k=1 tk · v∆k + tm+1 · 0, where 0 ≤ tk ≤ 1, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m + 1}, and
∑m+1
k=1 tk = 1.
Then µ v∆
∗ ∈ [−C,C]p′ , thus the set of lexicographically smallest coalitions S(x) does not change. By
Theorem 4.1 the vector {x} = PK(v) is also a pre-kernel element of game vµ∗ . But then by Theorem 4.4
the pre-kernel of game vµ
∗
consists of a single point, therefore {x} = PK(vµ∗).
Example 5.1. To see that even on the convex hull G4c , which is constituted by the default and related
games of Table 4.1, a particular TU game has the same singleton pre-kernel, we choose the following
vector of scalars ~t = (1, 3, 8, 1, 2, 4, 3, 5, 7, 9, 2, 3)/48 such that
∑12
k=1 tk = 1 is given to construct by
the convex combination of games presented by Table 4.1 a TU game vµ
∗
that reproduces the imputation
(44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9) as its sole pre-kernel. The TU game vµ
∗
on this convex hull in the game space that
replicates this pre-kernel is listed through Table 5.1:
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Table 5.1: A TU Game vµ
∗
on G4c with the same singleton Pre-Kernel as v
a,b
S vµ
∗
(S) S vµ
∗
(S) S vµ
∗
(S) S vµ
∗
(S)
{1} −1/23 {1, 2} 134/25 {2, 4} 173/1125 {1, 3, 4} 576/71
{2} 8/71 {1, 3} 530/137 {3, 4} 19/144 {2, 3, 4} 15/232
{3} 2/75 {1, 4} 179/178 {1, 2, 3} 1436/187 N 16
{4} 2/75 {2, 3} −8/157 {1, 2, 4} 1946/239
a Pre-Kernel and Pre-Nucleolus: (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9)
b Note: Computation performed with MatTuGames (cf. Meinhardt (2020b)).
This game is neither average-convex nor zero-monotonic, however, it is again semi-convex and has a rather
large core with a core volume of 97 percent w.r.t. the core of the average-convex game, and 20 vertices in
contrast to 16 vertices respectively. #
Let X and Y be two metric spaces. A set-valued function or correspondence σ of X into Y is a rule that
assigns to every element x ∈ X a non-empty subset σ(x) ⊂ Y. Given a correspondence σ : X ։ Y, the
corresponding graph of σ is defined by
Gr(σ) := {(x, y) ∈ X× Y | y ∈ σ(x)} . (5.1)
Definition 5.1. A set-valued function σ : X։ Y is closed, if Gr(σ) is a closed subset of X× Y
The graph of the pre-kernel correspondence PK is given by
Gr(PK) :=
{
(v,x) | v ∈ Gn,x ∈ I0(v), sij(x, v) = sji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
.
Similar, the graph of the solution set of function hv of type (3.3) is specified by
Gr(M(hv)) :=
{
(v,x) | v ∈ Gn,x ∈ I0(v), hv(x) = 0}
=
⋃
k∈J′
{
(v,x) | v ∈ Gn,x ∈ [~γk], hvγk(x) = 0
}
=
⋃
k∈J′
Gr(M(hvγk , [~γk])),
with J′ := {k ∈ J | g(~γk) = 0}. This graph is equal to the finite union of graphs of the restricted solution
sets of quadratic and convex functions hvγk of type (3.15). The restriction of each solution set of function
hvγk to [~γk] is bounded, closed, and convex (cf. Meinhardt (2013, Lemmata 7.1.3, 7.3.1)), hence each graph
Gr(M(hvγk , [~γk])) from the finite index set J
′ is bounded, closed and convex.
Proposition 5.1. The following relations are satisfied between the above graphs:
Gr(PK) = Gr(M(hv)) =
⋃
k∈J′
Gr(M(hvγk , [~γk])). (5.2)
Hence, the pre-kernel correspondence PK : G(N)։ Rn is closed and bounded.
Proof. The equality of the graph of the pre-kernel and the solution set of function hv follows in accordance
with Corollary 3.1. Finally, the last equality is a consequence of Theorem 7.3.1 byMeinhardt (2013). From
this argument boundedness and closedness follows.
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Definition 5.2. The correspondence σ : X։ Y is said to be upper hemi-continuous (uhc) at x if for every
open set O containing σ(x) ⊆ O it exists an open set Q ⊆ Y of x such that σ(x′) ⊆ O for every x′ ∈ Q.
The correspondence σ is uhc, if it is uhc for each x ∈ X.
Definition 5.3. The correspondence σ : X։ Y is said to be lower hemi-continuous (lhc) at x if for every
open set O in Y with σ(x) ∩ O 6= ∅ it exists an open set Q ⊆ Y of x such that σ(x′) ∩ O 6= ∅ for every
x′ ∈ Q. The correspondence σ is lhc, if it is lhc for each x ∈ X.
Lemma 5.1. Let X be a non-empty and convex polyhedral subset of Rp˜, and Y ⊆ Rn˜. If σ : X ։ Y is a
bounded correspondence with a convex graph, then σ is lower hemi-continuous.
Proof. For a proof see Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007, pp. 185-186).
Theorem 5.2. The pre-kernel correspondence PK : G(N)։ Rn is on Gnc upper hemi-continuous as well
as lower hemi-continuous, that is, continuous.
Proof. The non-empty set Gnc is a bounded polyhedral set, which is convex by construction. We draw from
Proposition 5.1 the conclusion that the graph of the pre-kernel correspondence is bounded and closed.
Form Theorem 5.1 it follows | J′ | = 1 on Gnc , this implies that the graph of the pre-kernel correspondence
is also convex on Gnc . The sufficient conditions of Lemma 5.1 are satisfied, hence PK is lower hemi-
continuous on Gnc . It is known from Theorem 9.1.7. by Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007) that PK is upper
hemi-continuous on G(N). Hence, on the restricted set Gnc , the set-valued function PK is upper and
lower hemi-continuous, and therefore continuous. Actual, it is a continuous function on Gnc in view of
| J′ | = 1.
Corollary 5.1. The pre-kernel correspondence PK : G(N)։ Rn is on Gnc single-valued and constant.
Example 5.2. To observe that on the restricted set G4c the pre-kernel correspondence PK : G(N) ։ R
n
is single-valued and continuous, we exemplarily select a line segment in G4c to establish that all games on
this segment have the same singleton pre-kernel. For this purpose, we resume Example 4.1 and 5.1. Then
we choose a vector of scalars ~tǫ := (1, 3, 8, 1, 2, 4 + ǫ, 3, 5, 7, 9, 2− ǫ, 3)/48 with tǫk ≥ 0 for each k such
that
∑11
k=0 t
ǫ
k = 1 and ǫ ∈ [−2, 2]. Thus, we define the line segment in G4c through TU game vµ
∗
from
Example 5.1 by
G4,lc :=
{ 11∑
k=0
tǫk · vµk
vµk ∈ G4c , ǫ ∈ [−2, 2]
}
.
Therefore, for each game in the line segment G
4,l
c , we can write
vǫ :=
11∑
k=1
tǫk · vµk + tǫ0 · v =
11∑
k=1
tk · vµk + t0 · v +
ǫ
48
(vµ6 − vµ11) = vµ
∗
+
ǫ
48
(vµ6 − vµ11)
= v + µ · v∆∗ + ǫ µ
48
(v∆6 − v∆11).
We extend the pre-kernel element x = (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9) to a vector x in order to define the excess
vector under game v as e := v − x, and for game vǫ as e vǫ := vǫ − x, respectively. According to these
definitions, we get for ~ζv
ǫ
= ~ξv
ǫ
at x the following chain of equalities:
~ξv
ǫ
= V⊤ e v
ǫ
= V⊤
(
v − x+ µ · v∆∗ + ǫ µ
48
(v∆6 − v∆11)
)
= V⊤ (v − x) = V⊤ e = ~ξ = ~ζ = 0,
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The last equality is satisfied, since x is the pre-kernel of game v. Recall that it holds µ v∆
∗
, µ v∆6 , µ v
∆
11 ∈
[−C,C]15, whereas V⊤ v∆∗ = V⊤ v∆6 = V⊤ v∆11 = 0 is in force. Therefore, for each TU game vǫ ∈ G4,lc
we obtain
PK(vǫ) = (44/9, 4, 32/9, 32/9).
The pre-kernel correspondence PK is a single-valued and constant mapping on G
4,l
c . Hence its is continu-
ous on the restriction G
4,l
c , and due to Theorem 5.2 a fortiori on G
4
c . #
6 PRESERVING THE PRE-NUCLEOLUS PROPERTY
In this section we study some conditions under which a pre-nucleolus of a default game can preserve
the pre-nucleolus property in order to generalize the above results in the sense to identify related games
with a sole pre-kernel point even when the default game has a set-valued pre-kernel point. This question
can only be addressed with limitation, since we are not able to make it explicit while giving only sufficient
conditions under which the pre-kernel point must be at least disconnected, otherwise it must be a singleton.
However, a great deal of our investigation is devoted to work out explicit conditions under which the pre-
nucleolus of a default game will loose this property under a related game.
For the next result remember that a balanced collection B is called minimal balanced, if it does not
contain a proper balanced sub-collection.
Theorem 6.1. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a set-valued pre-kernel such that x ∈ PK(v), y = ν(v)
with x,y ∈ [~γ]v, and x 6= y is satisfied. In addition, let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v with µ 6= 0
derived from x such that x ∈ PK(vµ) ∩ [~γ]vµ , and y 6∈ [~γ]vµ holds. If the collection Sv(x) as well as its
sub-collections are not balanced,
1. then y 6∈ PN(vµ).
2. Moreover, if in addition x = y 6∈ [~γ]vµ , then x 6∈ PN(vµ).
Proof. The proof starts with the first assertion.
1. By our hypothesis, x is a pre-kernel element of game v and a related game vµ that is derived from x.
There is no change in set of lexicographically smallest most effective coalitions Sv(x) under vµ due
to x ∈ [~γ]vµ , hence Sv(x) = Svµ(x). Moreover, we have µ · v∆ ∈ Rp′ . Furthermore, it holds y =
ν(v) by our assumption. Choose a balanced collectionB that contains Sv(x) such thatB is minimal.
Then single out any ψ ∈ R such that the balanced set Dv(ψ,y) satisfies Sv(x) ⊆ B ⊆ Dv(ψ,y) 6=
∅. Now choose ǫ > 0 such that Dv(ψ,y) = Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,y) is given. The set Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,y) is
balanced as well. Observe that due to x ∈ [~γ]vµ we get µ · v∆(S) ≤ ǫ for all S ⊂ N . However, it
exists some coalitions S ∈ Sv(x) such that ev(S,y)−ǫ 6≤ ev(S,y)+µ·v∆(S) holds. Let c ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ],
now as limc↑0 D
vµ(ψ+ c,y) = Dv
µ
(ψ,y) we haveDv
µ
(ψ,y) ⊆ Dv(ψ,y). Furthermore, we draw
the conclusion that Sv(x) 6⊆ Dvµ(ψ,y) is given due to Sv(x) = Sv(y) 6= Svµ(y). Therefore, we
obtain Dv
µ
(ψ,y) ⊂ B ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,y). To see this, assume that Dvµ(ψ,y) is balanced, then
we get B ⊆ Dvµ(ψ,y), since B is minimal balanced. This implies Sv(x) ⊆ Dvµ(ψ,y). However,
this contradicts Sv(x) 6⊆ Dvµ(ψ,y). We conclude that Dvµ(ψ,y) ⊂ B must hold, but then the set
Dv
µ
(ψ,y) can not be balanced. Hence, y 6∈ PN(vµ).
2. Finally, if x = y, then x is the pre-nucleolus of game v, but it does not belong anymore to payoff
equivalence class [~γ] under vµ, that is, [~γ] has shrunk. Therefore, Sv(x) 6= Svµ(x). Define from the
set Sv(x) a minimal balanced collection B that contains Sv(x). In the next step, we can single out
any ψ ∈ R such that the balanced set Dv(ψ,x) satisfies Sv(x) ⊆ B ⊆ Dv(ψ,x) 6= ∅. In view of
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x ∈ PK(vµ), it must exist an ǫ > 0 within the maximum surpluses can be varied without effecting
the pre-kernel property of x even when x 6∈ [~γ]vµ , thus we have µ · v∆(S) ≤ ǫ for all S ⊂ N . This
implies that Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,x) is in force. The set Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,x) is balanced as well.
However, it exists some coalitions S ∈ Sv(x) such that ev(S,x) − ǫ 6≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) is
valid. Let c ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ], now as limc↑0 Dvµ(ψ + c,x) = Dvµ(ψ,x) we have Dvµ(ψ,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ,x).
Furthermore, we draw the conclusion that Sv(x) 6⊆ Dvµ(ψ,x) is given due to Sv(x) 6= Svµ(x).
Therefore, we obtain Dv
µ
(ψ,x) ⊂ B ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,x) by the same reasoning as under (1). Then
the set Dv
µ
(ψ,x) can not be balanced. Hence, x 6∈ PN(vµ).
Theorem 6.2. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a set-valued pre-kernel such that x ∈ PK(v) ∩ [~γ],
{y} = PN(v) ∩ [~γ1] is satisfied, and let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v with µ 6= 0 derived from x such
that x ∈ PK(vµ) ∩ [~γ] holds. If ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 , then y 6∈ PK(vµ) and a fortiori y 6∈ PN(vµ).
Proof. From the payoff equivalence classes [~γ] and [~γ1]we derive the corresponding matricesW := V
⊤
U
and W1 := V
⊤
1 U, respectively. By assumption, it is ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 satisfied. From this argument, we
can express the vector of unbalanced excesses ~ξ v
µ
at y by
~ξ v
µ
= V⊤1 e
µ = V⊤1 (v
µ − y) = V⊤1 (v − y + µ · v∆) = ~ξ v + µ ·V⊤1 v∆ = µ ·V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0.
Observe that ~ξ v = V⊤1 (v − y) = 0, since vector y ∈ [~γ1] is a pre-kernel element of game v. However,
due to ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 , we obtain V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0, it follows that y 6∈ PK(vµ). The conclusion follows that
y 6∈ PN(vµ) must hold.
Theorem 6.3. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a set-valued pre-kernel such that x ∈ PK(v)\PN(v)
and x ∈ [~γ]. If 〈N, vµ 〉 is a related game of v with µ 6= 0 derived from x such that x ∈ PK(vµ) ∩ [~γ]
holds, then x 6∈ PN(vµ).
Proof. According to our assumption x is not the pre-nucleolus of game v, this implies that there exists
some ψ ∈ R such thatDv(ψ,x) 6= ∅ is not balanced. Recall that the set of lexicographically smallest most
effective coalitions Sv(x) has not changed under vµ, since x is a pre-kernel element of game vµ which still
belongs to the payoff equivalence class [~γ]. Then exists a bound ǫ > 0 within the maximum surpluses can
be varied without effecting the pre-kernel property of x. Thus, we get Dv(ψ,x) = Dv(ψ − 2 ǫ,x) 6= ∅ is
satisfied. Then ev(S,x)− ǫ ≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) ≤ ev(S,x) + ǫ for all S ⊆ N , therefore, this implies
Dv
µ
(ψ − ǫ,x) = Dv(ψ,x). The set Dvµ(ψ − ǫ,x) is not balanced, we conclude that x 6∈ PN(vµ).
Theorem 6.4. Assume that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] induced from TU game 〈N, v 〉 has non-empty
interior. In addition, assume that the pre-kernel of game 〈N, v 〉 constitutes a line segment such that
x ∈ PN(v) ∩ ∂[~γ], PK(v) ∩ [~γ1], and x ∈ PK(vµ) ∩ [~γ] is satisfied, then the pre-kernel PK(vµ) of a
related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉 with µ 6= 0 derived from x is at least disconnected, otherwise unique.
Proof. In the fist step, we have simply to establish that for game vµ the pre-imputations lying on the part
of the line segment included in payoff equivalence class [~γ1] under game v will loose their pre-kernel
properties due to the change in the game parameter. In the second step, we have to show that the pre-
nucleolus x under game v is also the pre-nucleolus of the related game vµ.
1. First notice that the payoff equivalence class [~γ] has full dimension in accordance with its non-empty
interior condition. This implies that the vector x must be the sole pre-kernel element in [~γ] (cf. with
the proof of Theorem 7.8.1 in Meinhardt (2013)). By our hypothesis, it is even a boundary point
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of the payoff equivalence class under game v. Moreover, it must hold [~γ] ≁ [~γ1], since the rank
of the induced matrix E⊤ is n, and that of E⊤1 is n − 1, therefore, we have E⊤1 6= E⊤X for all
X ∈ GL+(n).
In the next step, we select an arbitrary pre-kernel element from PK(v)∩ [~γ1], say y. By hypothesis,
there exists a related game vµ of v such that x ∈ PK(vµ) ∩ [~γ] holds, that is, there is no change
in matrix E and vector ~α implying hv
µ
(x) = hv
µ
γ (x) = 0. This implies that for game v
µ the
payoff equivalence class [~γ] has been enlarged in such a way that we can inscribe an ellipsoid
with maximum volume ε := {y′ |hvµγ (y′) ≤ c¯}, whereas hv
µ
γ is of type (3.15) and c¯ > 0 (cf.
Lemma 4.4.). It should be obvious that element x is an interior point of ε, since x = M(hv
µ
γ ) ⊂
ε ⊂ [~γ]. We single out a boundary point x′ in ∂[~γ] under game vµ which was a pre-kernel element
under game v, and satisfying after the parameter change the following properties: x′ ∈ ∂[~γ] ∩ [~γ1]
with x′ = x + z, and z 6= 0. This is possible due to the fact that the equivalence class [~γ] has
been enlarged at the expense of equivalence class [~γ1], which has shrunk or shifted by the change in
the game parameter. Observe now that two cases may happen, that is, either x′ ∈ ε or x′ /∈ ε. In
the former case, we have hv
µ
γ (x
′) = hv
µ
(x′) = hv
µ
γ1 (x
′) = c¯ > 0, and in the latter case, we have
hv
µ
γ (x
′) = hv
µ
(x′) = hv
µ
γ1 (x
′) > c¯ > 0 = hv(x′) = hvγ1(x
′).
From hv
µ
γ1 (x
′) > 0, and notice that the vector of unbalanced excesses at x′ is denoted as ~ξ v
µ
, we
derive the following relationship
hv
µ
γ1 (x
′) = ‖ ~ξ vµ ‖2 = ‖ ~ξ v + µ ·V⊤1 v∆ ‖2 = ‖µ ·V⊤1 v∆ ‖2 = µ2 · ‖V⊤1 v∆ ‖2 > 0,
with µ 6= 0. Thus, we have V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0, and therefore ∆ ∈ NW\NW1 . Observe that ~ξ v =
V
⊤
1 (v− x′) = 0, since vector x′ ∈ [~γ1] is a pre-kernel element of game v. Take the vector y ∈ [~γ1]
from above that was on the line segment as vector x′ under game v which constituted a part of the
pre-kernel of game v, we conclude that y 6∈ PK(vµ) in accordance with V⊤1 v∆ 6= 0.
2. By our hypothesis, x is the pre-nucleolus of game v, and an interior point of equivalence class
[~γ] of the related game vµ. Using a similar argument as under (1) we can inscribe an ellipsoid with
maximum volume ε, whereas hv
µ
γ is of type (3.15) and c¯ > 0. In view of the assumption that x is also
pre-kernel element of game vµ, we can draw the conclusion that the set of lexicographically smallest
most effective coalitions S(x) has not changed under vµ. But then, we have µ · v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ .
In addition, there exists a ψ¯ ≥ ψ∗ s.t. S(x) ⊆ Dv(ψ¯,x), that is, it satisfies Property I of Kohlberg
(1971). Moreover, matrix E⊤ induced from S(x) has full rank, therefore, the column vectors of
matrix E⊤ are a spanning system of Rn. Hence, we get span {1S |S ∈ S(x)} = Rn as well, which
implies that matrix [1S ]S∈S(x) has rank n, the collection S(x) must be balanced. In accordance with
vector x as the pre-nucleolus of game v, we can choose the largest ψ ∈ R s.t. ∅ 6= Dv(ψ,x) ⊆ S(x)
is valid, which is a balanced set. Since C > 0, the set Dv(ψ − 2C,x) 6= ∅ is balanced as well.
Now observe that ev(S,x) − C ≤ ev(S,x) + µ · v∆(S) ≤ ev(S,x) + C for all S ⊆ N . This
impliesDv(ψ,x) ⊆ S(x) ⊆ Dvµ(ψ − C,x) ⊆ Dv(ψ − 2C,x), hence,Dvµ(ψ − C,x) is balanced.
To conclude, let c ∈ [−C,C], and from the observation limc↑0 Dvµ(ψ + c,x) = Dvµ(ψ,x) ⊇
Dv(ψ,x), we draw the implication x = ν(N, v µ).
Finally, recall that the vector x is also the unique minimizer of function hv
µ
γ , which is an interior point
of payoff equivalence class [~γ], therefore the pre-kernel of the related game vµ can not be connected.
Otherwise the pre-kernel of the game consists of a single point.
Corollary 6.1. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a non single-valued pre-kernel such that x ∈ PN(v) ∩
∂[~γ] and let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v derived from x, whereas x ∈ int [~γ]vµ , then x = ν(N, v µ).
32
On the Replication of the Pre-Kernel and Related Solutions
7 THE ANTI-PRE-KERNEL AND ANTI-PRE-NUCLEOLUS
Generically, cooperative game theory studies the circumstances under which mutual cooperation becomes
attractive to establish an agreement. The purpose of this subsection is now the reverse study, that is,
to focus on the conditions under which it becomes unattractive within the game context, that is, under
which conditions a possible outcome becomes unstable within a bargaining situation. For seeing its rele-
vance, one has to take into account that a transferable utility game represents a virtual bargaining situation
where arguments as claims or proposals can be exchanged through communication to reach an agreement.
Although the communicational aspect is not visible by the characteristic function, it is, nevertheless, of
fundamental importance of how we have to read and understand a TU game. Under this consideration
of a TU game, it is a crucial aspect to identify the outcomes which are not supportable as agreements to
motivate a partner to move in order to finally reach an agreement point (see for more details Meinhardt
(2018a)).
To this end, let us notice that the anti-imputation set I#(N, v) is specified by
I#(N, v) :=

~x ∈ I∗(N, v)
 ∑
k∈N\{i}
xk ≤ v(N \ {i}) for all i ∈ N

 , (7.1)
whereas I∗(N, v) is the pre-imputation set. Obviously, we get I#(N, v) = I(N, v∗) or I#(N, v∗) =
I(N, v), since it holds for all i ∈ N the subsequent inequality
x(N\{i}) ≤ v∗(N\{i}) ⇐⇒ x(N\{i}) ≤ v(N)− v({i}) ⇐⇒ xi ≥ v({i}),
whenever x(N) = v(N) is given.
The anti-core of a game C#(N, v) is the set of pre-imputations satisfying besides the anti-individual
rationality property also the anti-coalitional rationality property, i.e. the anti-core of a game v ∈ Gn is
given by
C#(N, v) := {x ∈ I∗(N, v) |x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≤ v(S) ∀ S ⊂ N} . (7.2)
The anti-core of a n-person game may be empty. Whenever it is non-empty, this set specifies the im-
putations that makes mutual cooperation in the grand coalition unattractive. An anti-core selection is a
blocking outcome in the sense that such a payoff distribution relies in the feasible set of all coalitions.
Thus, a payoff distribution located in the anti-core can be blocked by any coalition. Therefore, each coali-
tion can formulate an objection against this allocation. As a consequence, the anti-core is the set of all
pre-imputation that prevents mutual cooperation in the grand coalition. Or to put it differently, it describes
the set of all allocations that are vulnerable by preventive arguments. For convex games the set of vul-
nerable allocations is empty, but non-empty for concave games. Moreover, the grand coalition might not
distribute to its members a value that exceeds the value that the intermediate coalitions can produce to their
members. Hence, the formation of a larger coalition is not rewarding. By this interpretation, we realize
that it is a conceptual misunderstanding of mutual cooperation if one speaks in the context of the anti-core
from a dual core.
A particular example of a blocking outcome under a non-empty anti-core is the anti-pre-nucleolus.
Thus, if the anti-core exists, then the anti-pre-nucleolus under which the smallest excesses of all coalitions
are maximized must belong to the anti-core, that is, all excesses must be greater than or equal to zero. In
this specific case, the anti-pre-nucleolus is a payoff distribution that prevents mutual cooperation in the
grand coalition.
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Even though it is easily seen that the anti-core of a dual game 〈N, v∗ 〉 coincides with the core C(N, v)
of game 〈N, v 〉, we clarify the relationship first. Starting with the anti-core C#(N, v∗) of a dual game
〈N, v∗ 〉, we get
C#(N, v∗) := {~x ∈ I∗(N, v)| x(S) ≤ v∗(S) for all S ⊆ N}
⇐⇒ {~x ∈ I∗(N, v)| x(S) + x(N\S)− x(N\S) ≤ v(N)− v(N\S) for all S ⊆ N}
⇐⇒ {~x ∈ I∗(N, v)| x(N\S) ≥ v(N\S) for all S ⊆ N} = C(N, v).
(7.3)
Resume now that a solution σ is called self dual, if σ(N, v) = σ(N, v∗) for all 〈N, v 〉 ∈ GU. Notice
that for additive games the core is self dual, that is, the core coincides with the core of the dual game.
This is due to v = v∗. However, the core of the game is also identical to the anti-core of the game, i.e.,
C(N, v) = C#(N, v). Implying that both the incentives and disincentives of cooperating in the grand
coalition are weak.
It was a commonly held belief of game theorists that the pre-nucleolus of the modest bankruptcy game
is identical to the pre-nucleolus of its dual game, the greedy bankruptcy game. Following Funaki and
Meinhardt (2006), we provide the framework to illustrate that this belief is false.
In this respect, remember that the dual v∗ : 2N → R of the TU game 〈N, v〉 is defined by v∗(S) =
v(N)−v(N\S) for all S ⊆ N . The worth v∗(S) is the amount fromwhich coalition S cannot be prevented
from by the opponents whenever they receive v(N\S). The preventive power of the opponents prevent
coalition S to get more than v∗(S). Or to put it differently, v∗(S) is the amount coalition S prevents
access from outsiders. The pre-kernel of the dual game v∗, known as the dual pre-kernel, is denoted by
PK d(N, v), and it takes the preventive power of coalitions during a negotiation into account. Notice that
the subsequent equality holds PK d(N, v) = PK(N, v∗) for any v ∈ Gn. Observe that by this relation it
is just enough to investigate the preventive power of coalitions within the initial game setting rather than
deriving the dual.
By the work of Funaki and Meinhardt (2006), we know that the pre-nucleolus of the dual game v∗
(dual pre-nucleolus) coincides with the anti-pre-nucleolus of the game v. Here, we restate the theorem
Theorem 7.1 (Funaki and Meinhardt (2006)). Let 〈N, v 〉 ∈ G be a transferable utility game. Then the
pre-nucleolus of the dual game v∗ coincides with the anti-pre-nucleolus of the game v, i.e.;
PN d(N, v) = PN(N, v∗) = PN#(N, v). (7.4)
Proof. See, for instance, Funaki and Meinhardt (2006) or Meinhardt (2018b).
The same we can illustrate for the dual pre-kernel and the anti-pre-kernel. For doing so, consider that
for a game v, such that for any pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, the minimum surplus (maximum loss) of
player i over player j with respect to the pre-imputation x ∈ I∗(N, v), is given by the minimum excess at
x over the set of coalitions containing player i but not player j. The anti-surplus (minimum surplus) is
defined to be
s#ij(x, v) := min
S∈Gij
ev(S,x) where Gij := {S | i ∈ S and j /∈ S}. (7.5)
The expression s#ij(x) describes the minimal amount at the pre-imputation x that player i can gain without
the cooperation of player j. The set of all pre-imputations x ∈ I∗(N, v) that balances the minimum
surpluses for each distinct pair of player i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, is called the anti-pre-kernel of the game v, and
is defined by
PK#(N, v) := {x ∈ I∗(N, v) | s#ij(x, v) = s#ji(x, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}. (7.6)
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Similar, to the solution concept of the dual pre-kernel, we introduce the notion of an anti-pre-kernel of the
dual game v∗, that will be called the dual anti-pre-kernel, which is denoted by (PK#) d(N, v).
The next theorem asserts that the pre-kernel of the dual game v∗ (dual pre-kernel) coincides with the
anti-pre-kernel of v. We restate this result in connection with its proof.
Theorem 7.2 (Funaki and Meinhardt (2006)). Let v be a transferable utility game. Then the pre-kernel of
the dual game v∗ (dual pre-kernel) coincides with the anti-pre-kernel of v, that is
PK d(N, v) = PK(N, v∗) = PK#(N, v). (7.7)
Proof. Using the definition of the dual game v∗ and the definition of the pre-kernel (2.6), then we obtain
sij(~x, v
∗) = max
S∈Gij
[v∗(S)− x(S)] = max
S∈Gij
[v(N)− v(N\S)− x(S)]
= max
N\S∈Gji
[−v(N\S) + x(N\S)] = − min
T∈Gji
[v(T )− x(T )] = −s#ji(~x, v).
Thus, the maximum surplus of player i against player j in the dual game v∗ is equal to the negative of the
anti-surplus of player j against player i in the game v. Applying the definition of the pre-kernel, and we
get
sij(~x, v
∗) = sji(~x, v
∗)⇐⇒ s#ji(~x, v) = s#ij(~x, v).
Thus, the dual pre-kernel coincides with the anti-pre-kernel.
REMARK 7.1 (Anti-Pre-Kernel).
It should be obvious that due to v∗∗ = v, we havePK(N, v∗∗) = PK(N, v), and the pre-kernel of the game
v is identical to the anti-pre-kernel of the dual game v∗, hence it holds that PK(N, v) = PK#(N, v∗). ✸
Notice that in this respect we can apply the indirect function approach. For seeing this let us recall
Lemma 3.1 that states that sij(x, v) = π(x
i,j,δ) − δ holds true for every i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, and for every
δ ≥ δ1(x, v). Thus, in case of the game v, we get for any x
π(x i,j,δ) = sij(x, v) + δ = −s#ji(~x, v∗) + δ, (7.8)
for every i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. This reveals that the indirect function of game v can also be expressed in
terms of the minimum surpluses of its dual. Similar, the indirect function of the dual game v∗ can be
characterized in terms of the minimum surpluses of its primal v. Thus, if we denote the indirect function
of the dual game as π∗, we can introduce a new non-negative valued objective function h# on I∗(N, v)
through
h#(x) =
∑
i,j∈N
i<j
(π∗(x i,j,δ)− π∗(x j,i,δ))2 + (v∗(N)− x(N))2
=
∑
i,j∈N
i<j
(s#ij(~x, v)− s#ji(~x, v))2 + (v(N)− x(N))2 x ∈ I∗(N, v).
(7.9)
Alike to function h of type 3.3, it is neither quadratic nor convex. By this arguments we observe that the
whole machinery of the indirect function is applicable in case of the anti-pre-kernel of game v.
In contrast to the pre-kernel of a game which balances all pairs of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j of max-
imum surpluses we observe by Definition 7.6 that the anti-pre-kernel balances all pairs i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
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of minimum surpluses instead. Thus with some appropriate modifications for Algorithm 3.1, we can de-
scribe a method of evaluating an element of the anti-pre-kernel. As a starting point we have to rewrite
Definition 3.6 of the set of most effective coalitions in such a way that we select out those coalitions hav-
ing minimum surpluses, that is, we want single out the less effective coalitions for all pairs of players
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. For doing so, we formally define the set of less effective or insignificant coalitions for
each pair of players i, j ∈ N, i 6= j at the payoff vector x by
C
#
ij (x) :=
{
S ∈ Gij
 s#ij (x, v) = ev(S,x)
}
. (7.10)
Substituting in the Definition (3.7) up to (3.10) the set of most effective coalitions by the set of less
effective coalitions let us end up with the set of lexicographically smallest less effective coalitionsw.r.t. x
which is defined by
S#(x) :=
{
S
#
ij (x)
i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
}
. (7.11)
Similar, we can construct from the set S#(x) a rectangular matrix denoted as E# ∈ Rn×q. From this
matrix and its transpose a matrix Q# ∈ Rn2 is determined by Q# = 2 · (E)# (E#)⊤, and a column
vector a# by 2 · E# ~α# ∈ Rn. Defining each component of the vector as α#ij := (v(S#ij ) − v(S#ji )) ∈
R ∀i, j ∈ N, i < j and α#0 := v(N). Finally, the scalar α# is given by ‖~α#‖2, whereas E# ∈
Rn×q, (E#)⊤ ∈ Rq×n and ~α# ∈ Rq.
From vector ~γ the matrix Q#, column vector a#, and scalar α# are induced from which a modified
quadratic and convex function can be specified through
h#γ (x) = (1/2) · 〈 x,Q# x 〉+ 〈 x,a# 〉+ α# x ∈ Rn, (7.12)
which reflects the underlying minimum surpluses w.r.t. payoff equivalence class [~γ]#. Now, observe
that we can replicate from the finite set of equivalence classes the function h# s.t. it is composed of a
finite family of quadratic functions of type (7.12) (analogously to Meinhardt (2013, Proposition 6.2.2)).
Provided that the game context is clear, we refer to h#, otherwise to hv#. Similar, for function h#γ with
hv#γ in case of an ambiguous context.
In the next step, we select a payoff vector ~γ, which also determines its payoff set [~γ]#. With regard
to the binary relation ∼ on the set domh# defined by x ∼ ~γ ⇐⇒ S#(x) = S#(~γ) is an equivalence
relation, which forms a partition of the set domh# by the collection of equivalence classes {[~γk]#}k∈J ,
where J is an arbitrary index set. This vector induces in addition a set of lexicographically smallest less
effective coalitions indicated by S#(~γ). Furthermore, we can also define a set of vectors as the differences
of unity games w.r.t. the set of lexicographically smallest less effective coalitions, which is given by
v#ij := 1
Sij − 1Sji for Sij , Sji ∈ S#(~γ) and v0 := 1N , (7.13)
whereas v#ij ,v0 ∈ Rp
′
for all i, j ∈ N, i < j. With these column vectors, we can identify matrix
V
# := [v#1,2, . . . ,v
#
n−1,n,v0] ∈ Rp
′×q. Notice that we get (V#)⊤ v = ~α# in this context.
Redefining the mapping (3.18) by replacing the corresponding matrix, vector and scalar by their anti-
counterparts, we obtain a mapping that sends a point ~γ to a point ~γ◦ ∈M(h#γ ). This mapping is identified
through
Γ#(~γ) := −
(
(Q
#
)† a#
)
(~γ) = −
(
(Q#)†~γ a
#
~γ
)
= ~γ◦ ∈M(h#γ ) ∀~γ ∈ Rn, (7.14)
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where Q#γ and a
#
γ are the matrix and the column vector induced by vector ~γ, respectively. The solution
set of function h#γ is denoted byM(h
#
γ ).
By the above procedure we provided a dual characterization of the anti-pre-kernel – a solution concept
from transferable utility games that incorporates the preventive power of coalitions and which gives the
same solution as the dual pre-kernel – without explicitly introducing the dual game. That is to say, we have
preserved the original game context. Consequently, we do not have changed the theoretical framework in
which subjects are involved while considering the preventive power effect. Thus, the reference and com-
parability to the original game setting is not lost by this approach (cf. Meinhardt (2018b,c)). In contrast,
to the modiclus, which we are going to discuss in the subsequent section.
After having observed that the pre-kernel and the anti-pre-kernel can be both characterized by the
indirect function approach, we introduce now a method similar to those of Algorithm 3.1 for computing
an anti-pre-kernel element of a TU game 〈N, v 〉, which we have formalized by means of pseudo-code
through Algorithm 7.1:
Algorithm 7.1: Procedure to seek for an Anti-Pre-Kernel Element
Data: Arbitrary TU Game 〈N, v 〉, and a payoff vector ~γ0 ∈ R
n.
Result: A payoff vector s.t. ~γk+1 ∈ PK
#(v).
begin
0 k ←− 0, S#(~γ−1) ←− ∅
1 Select an arbitrary starting point ~γ0
if ~γ0 /∈ PK
#(v) then Continue
else Stop
2 Determine S#(~γ0)
if S#(~γ0) 6= S
#(~γ−1) then Continue
else Stop
repeat
3 if S#(~γk) 6= ∅ then Continue
else Stop
4 Compute E
#
k and ~α
#
k from S
#(~γk) and v
5 DetermineQ
#
k and a
#
k from E
#
k and ~α
#
k
6 Calculate by Formula (7.14) x
7 k ←− k + 1
8 ~γ#k+1 ←− x
9 Determine S#(~γk+1)
until S#(~γk+1) = S
#(~γk)
end
Example 7.1. Let us resume Example 4.1. By the foregoing discussion we became aware that game
v is average-convex that possesses a sole pre-kernel point. Applying the computation procedure from
Algorithm 7.1 we get an element of the anti-pre-kernel that is quantified through (8, 53/12, 37/12, 1/2).
Conducting an analogous analysis in lieu thereof for the anti-pre-kernel as outlined below for the pre-
kernel – which we formalize in the forthcoming Section 9 –, we infer that this point is also the sole anti-
pre-kernel element that coincides with the anti-pre-nucleolus. In addition, we even realize that this point
is also identical to the modiclus. From Meinhardt (2018b, Section 10) it is known that that the modiclus
coincides with the anti-pre-nucleolus for the class of PS, weighted graph, and modest bankruptcy games.
Though we have evidence from the literature that coincidence is not necessarily guaranteed for convex
games (cf. Sudho¨lter (1997a, Section 3)). #
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8 THE MODICLUS
The modiclus is a solution concept from cooperative game theory, which was invented by Sudho¨lter (1993),
and introduced into the literature by Sudho¨lter (1996); Sudho¨lter (1997a); Rosenmu¨ller and Sudho¨lter
(2004); Raghavan and Sudho¨lter (2005) or Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007) just to mention the best-known of
those. Sometimes this solution concept is called the modified nucleolus to stress its close relationship to the
(pre-)nucleolus, which was introduced by Schmeidler (1969). However, as it was worked out byMeinhardt
(2018b), there is also a close relationship to the anti-pre-nucleolus (cf. Funaki and Meinhardt (2006)). This
is caused by the fact that the modiclus takes the primal as well as the preventive power (dual power) of
coalitions during a stylized bargaining scenario into account.
Most solution concepts incorporate the exercised or potential power of a coalition (primal power) to
enforce their claims of its members. However, as it was discussed in the previous Section 7, each coalition
has also a preventive power (dual power) that can be captured by the dual game of v, which is defined by
v∗(S) = v(N) − v(N\S) for all S ⊆ N . Resume that v∗(S) is the amount that coalition S cannot be
prevented from when the complement N\S receives the payoff v(N\S) or in other words, the amount
coalition S prevents access from outsiders. Thus, if the opponents N\S of a coalition S are powerful, the
larger is the amount coalition S must renounce. Implying that the potential bargaining power of S must
be weak, and vice versa. Solution concepts which incorporate the preventive power of coalitions are, for
instance, the aforementioned anti-(pre-)nucleolus or anti-(pre)-kernel.
However, the modiclus simultaneously consider besides the primal power also the preventive power of
the game. Thus, the modiclus addresses in a stylized bargaining process not only to the exercised power
that a coalition can carry out, but also to its potential power to weakening the bargaining situation of
opponents. Consequently, its figure of argumentation is pointing to a different stylized bargaining scenario.
This means that subjects who are trying to obtain an agreement based on the principles of distributive
justice related to the modiclus are pointing even to the dual game to enforce it within the original bargaining
context, namely the dual game, which is not strategical equivalent to the former. From this point of
view, it reveals arbitrariness in the imposed argumentation, and can therefore only be considered as a
relative obscure and artificial perception of modeling a stylized bargaining process due to its changes in the
bargaining agenda. As a consequence the theoretical framework in which subjects are involved changes,
with the result that the reference and comparability to the original setting is lost. By this argument, we
do not think so that this conceptual defect is healed due to the self-duality of the modiclus (cf. Meinhardt
(2018b,c)).
Despite this obvious criticism, we nevertheless suppose that it is worthwhile to investigate this solution
concept further with a greater accurateness as it was done in the prevailing literature. We are convinced
that this solution concept merits more than an opaque and erroneous presentation that has been provided
in the past by his inventor (cf. Meinhardt (2019)). In particular, we observe its full potential in advancing
our understanding of compliance w.r.t. a bargaining agreement (cf. Meinhardt (2018a)). Especially, its
close relationship to the pre-nucleolus and pre-kernel will be quite helpful to establish new insights in this
direction. For doing so, we size – similar to the pre-kernel – on replication results. However, before we
can focus on this issue, we have to invoke a short detour to discuss the modiclus in some details.
In order to define the modiclus, denoted as ς∗(N, v), of a game v ∈ Gn, take any x ∈ I∗(N, v) to define
a (22·n − 1)-tuple vector θ˜(x, v) whose components are the bi-excesses ev(S,x)− ev(T,x) of coalitions
S, T ⊆ N , arranged in decreasing order, that is,
θ˜i(x, v) := e
v(Sk,x)− ev(Tl,x) ≥ ev(So,x)− ev(Tp,x) =: θ˜j(x, v)
if 1 ≤ i = k + l ≤ j = o+ p ≤ 22·n − 1. (8.1)
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Arranging the so-called bi-complaint or bi-dissatisfaction vectors θ˜(x) for all x ∈ I∗(N, v) by the lexico-
graphic order ≤L on R22·n−1, we shall write
θ˜(x, v) <L θ˜(z, v) if ∃ an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ 22·n − 1, (8.2)
such that θ˜m(x, v) = θ˜m(z, v) for 1 ≤ m < k and θ˜k(x, v) < θ˜k(z, v). Furthermore, we write θ˜(x, v) ≤L
θ˜(z, v) if either θ˜(x, v) <L θ˜(z, v) or θ˜(x, v) = θ˜(z, v). Notice that we omit in the sequel the game in the
term θ˜ provided that the context is clear.
Then the modiclusMD(N, v) over the pre-imputations set I∗(N, v) is defined by
MD(N, v) =
{
x ∈ I∗(N, v) | θ˜(x) ≤L θ˜(z) ∀ z ∈ I∗(N, v)
}
. (8.3)
Themodiclus of any game v ∈ Gn is non-empty as well as unique, and it is referred to as ς∗(N, v). At this
set the total bi-complaint θ˜(x) is lexicographically minimized over the non-empty, compact and convex
imputation set I∗(N, v). Notice that by the construction of the vector θ˜(x), it inherits the same structure
as θ(x), which exhibits its relation to the (pre-)nucleolus (cf. Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007)).
Analogously to the (pre-)nucleolus, the modiclus ς∗(N, v) can be determined while solving recursively
a sequence of linear programs. For describing a method, we suppose that n ≥ 2. First we define for
k = −1 the set Q−1 := ∅, and for k = 0 we define P˜ 0 := (2N × 2N )\({∅} × {∅}). Then we consider for
each k ∈ N0 the subsequent linear problem
τ k =min t
s.t. ev(S,y)− ev(T,y) ≤ t ∀(S, T ) ∈ P˜ k and y ∈ X k{
ev(S,y)− ev(T,y) = τ i−1 ∀(S, T ) ∈ Q i}
i∈{−1,0,1,...,k−1}
,
(8.4)
whereas Q k := {(S, T ) ∈ P˜ k−1| ev(S,y) − ev(T,y) = τk−1}, and P˜ k := P˜ k−1\Q k−1. Finally, we
define X 0 := I∗(N, v) and
X k := {y ∈ X k−1| ev(S,y)− ev(T,y) ≤ τ k−1 ∀(S, T ) ∈ P˜ k−1},
for k ∈ N+.
Algorithm 8.1: Method for Computing the Modiclus
Data: Arbitrary TU Game 〈N, v 〉.
Result: A payoff vector s.t. yk+1 = ς
∗(N, v).
begin
0 k ←− 0, P˜ 0 := (2N × 2N )\({∅} × {∅}),Q−1 := ∅
repeat
1 if P˜ k 6= ∅ then Continue
else Stop
2 Determine a pair (τ k,yk) s.t. solves LP (8.4)
3 Determine X k+1 := {y ∈ X k| ev(S,y)− ev(T,y) ≤ τ k ∀(S, T ) ∈ P˜ k}
4 if yk ∈ X
k+1 then Continue
else Stop
5 Determine Q k := {(S, T ) ∈ P˜ k−1| ev(S,y)− ev(T,y) = τk−1}
6 Determine ˜P k+1 := P˜ k\Q k
7 k ←− k + 1
until P˜ k+1 = P˜ k
end
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For each k ∈ N+ the feasible set of linear programs (8.4) constitutes a non-empty convex polytope s.t.
a pair (τ k,yk) exists which minimizes LP (8.4).
Resume that if x ∈ I∗(N, v), then
ev(N\S,x) = v(N\S)− x(N\S) = −v(N) + v(N\S)− x(N\S) + x(N)
= −v∗(S) + x(S) = e−v∗(S,−x) = −(v∗(S)− x(S)) = −ev∗(S,x),
for all S ⊆ N . Then we redefine the bi-complaint vector by
θ¯i(x, v) := e
v(Sk,x) + e
v∗(Tl,x) ≥ ev(So,x) + ev∗(Tp,x) =: θ¯j(x, v)
if 1 ≤ i = k + l ≤ j = o+ p ≤ 22·n − 1, (8.5)
to collocate it in a non increasing order by θ¯(x, v) for all x ∈ I∗(N, v), and we can rewrite the modiclus
MD(N, v) over the pre-imputations set I∗(N, v) as
MD(N, v) =
{
x ∈ I∗(N, v) | θ¯(x) ≤L θ¯(z) ∀ z ∈ I∗(N, v)
}
. (8.6)
due to θ˜(y, v) = θ¯(y, v) for all y ∈ I∗(N, v). From this result we can even deduce that the modiclus must
be self-dual. Hence,MD(N, v) = MD(N, v∗).
In order to derive a characterization of the modiclus that is based on the preventive power of coalitions,
we need to introduce and discuss some dual game properties, which are the reflections of the concepts
introduced in Subsection 8.2.
8.1 SOME PRIMAL GAME PROPERTIES TO CHARACTERIZE THE MODICLUS
In the course of this Section, we introduce and discuss some game properties, which are indispensable to
get a characterization of the modiclus and its related solutions. For a more thoroughly discussion of this
topic we refer the reader to Meinhardt (2018b).
To start with, we define the maximal excess of game v w.r.t. the distribution x by
κ(x, v) := max
S⊆N
ev(S,x).
From this and ev(S,x) = −ev∗(N\S,x) for all S ⊆ N and x ∈ I∗(N, v), we obviously get
κ(x, v) = −min
S⊆N
ev
∗
(N\S,x).
Furthermore, by the definition we observe that κ(x, v) = π(x)must hold. In order to avoid any confusion
related to the modiclus or related solution concept, we rely on the notation that was introduced/applied in
the literature. We do discuss the link to the indirect function π only when it is necessary.
In addition, define the set N¯ = N × {0, 1} s.t. N × {0} = N and N × {1} = N∗, which forms a
partition through N¯ = N ⊎ N∗. Consider the mapping ϑ : N → N∗ that is bijective s.t. ϑ(i) = i∗ is
given for each i ∈ N in order to notice that each coalition S ⊆ N can be mapped one-to-one and onto to
a coalition ϑ(S) = S∗ in N∗ s.t. |S| = |S∗| holds.
For studying the axiomatization of the modiclus, we define the dual extension of a game v by
v¯(S ⊎ T ∗) := v(S) + v∗(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N, (8.7)
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whereas the primal extension of the dual game v∗ is specified by
v¯∗(S ⊎ T ∗) := v∗(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N, (8.8)
with the relation
v¯∗(S ⊎ T ∗) = v¯(N ⊎N∗)− v¯((N ⊎N∗)\(S ⊎ T ∗))
= v¯(N∗ ⊎N)− v¯(N\S ⊎N∗\T ∗)
= v¯(N∗ ⊎N)− v(N\S)− v∗(N\T )
= 2 · v(N)− v(N\S)− v(N) + v(T )
= v(N)− v(N\S) + v(T ) = v∗(S) + v(T ) = v(T ) + v∗(S)
= v¯(T ⊎ S∗),
(8.9)
for all S, T ⊆ N .
Definition 8.1 (Dual Cover). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game and let ϑ : N → N∗ be a bijective map with
i 7→ ϑ(i) such that N¯ = N ⊎N∗. Define the dual cover game, denoted as 〈N¯ , v˜〉, by
v˜(S ⊎ T ∗) := max{v(S) + v∗(T ), v∗(S) + v(T )} ∀ S, T ⊆ N, (8.10)
which is the dual cover of game v.
This game accounts for an optimistic assessment of the combined influence of the exercised and pre-
ventive power of a pair of coalitions. That means, a pair of coalitions pointing during a negotiation on the
highest amount of its combined power to assure for its members the largest possible share.
Definition 8.2 (LED and Diverse Game Properties). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game.
1. We define the upper marginal contribution respectively lower marginal contribution of a player
k ∈ N to a coalition w.r.t. game 〈N, v〉 by
rk(N, v) := max
S⊆N\{i}
(
v(S ∪ {k})− v(S))
lk(N, v) = min
S⊆N\{i}
(
v(S ∪ {k})− v(S)).
2. The TU game 〈N,w〉 is a shift game of v, if there exists a real number t ∈ R s.t.
w(S) :=
{
v(S) + t if ∅ 6= S 6= N
v(S) otherwise.
(8.11)
This game is denoted as the t-shift game of v, defined as v∧t.
3. Let x ∈ I∗(N, v) be a pre-imputation, and define the excess comparability cover game 〈N, vx〉 by
vx(S) :=
{
v(S) ifS ∈ {∅, N},
max
{
v(S) + κ + 2κ∗, v∗(S) + κ∗ + 2κ
}
otherwise,
(8.12)
for all S ⊆ N with κ := κ(x, v) and κ∗ := κ(x, v∗, ). More concisely, we denote the excess
comparability cover game as ECC game.
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4. For each x ∈ I∗(N, v), we define the large excess difference by
Λ(x, v) := min
∅6=T⊂N
(
v(T )− v∗(T ))− κ, (8.13)
whereas κ := max{ev(S,x) | ∅ 6= S ⊂ N} indicates the maximal nontrivial excess at the pre-
imputation x. It is applied the convention that min ∅ = ∞ and max ∅ = −∞ holds, in addition,
with Λ(x, v) = 0, if |N | = 1.
5. The TU game 〈N, v〉 possesses the large excess difference property (LED) w.r.t. x ∈ I∗(N, v), if
Λ(x, v) ≥ 0 holds.
6. A vector dv ∈ RN is denoted as the difference vector of maximal and minimal marginal contri-
butions w.r.t. v and x, and is defined by
dvi := ri(N, v)− li(N, v)
= max
S⊆N\{i}
(
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S))− min
S⊆N\{i}
(
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)),
for each i ∈ N with the convention that dvi = 0, if |N | = 1.
Notice that the difference vector dv ∈ RN of maximal and minimal marginal contributions w.r.t. v
and x specifies the reasonableness range in which a solution vector x ought to be located. It ought to be
bounded from above by the maximal amount of marginal contribution w.r.t. a particular coalition, and to be
bounded from below by the minimal marginal contribution of a player to a coalition. Thus, it is reasonable
that a player should not receive an amount that is beyond this upper bound, and an amount that is not below
the lower bound in order to get a fair bargaining outcome. Now, the difference vector dv ∈ RN measures
the fairness range in which an outcome can be vary.
Next, we define the set of symmetric pre-imputation by
SI∗(N¯ , v˜) :=
{
z ∈ I∗(N¯ , v˜)  zi = zi∗ for all i ∈ N}.
Lemma 8.1 (Rosenmu¨ller and Sudho¨lter (2004)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game and let 〈N¯ , v˜〉 its associated
dual cover as given by Definition 8.1 and take x := (~x, ~x ∗) ∈ SI∗(N¯ , v˜), then the reduced game v˜N,x is
specified by
v˜N,x(S) :=


0 if S = ∅
v(N) if S = N
max
{
v(S) + κ(~x, v∗), v∗(S) + κ(~x, v)
}
otherwise.
(8.14)
In addition, the maximal excesses of game v¯, v¯∗, v˜ and w := v˜N,x w.r.t. x are given by κ(x, w) =
κ(x, v˜) = κ(x, v¯) = κ(x, v¯∗) = κ∗ + κ. Notice that w is the reduced game of v˜ w.r.t. coalition N
and x.
Proof. See Meinhardt (2018b).
Lemma 8.2 (Sudho¨lter (1997a).). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game s.t. |N | ≥ 2, and choose x ∈ I∗(N, v). Then
the following relations are satisfied
1.
Λ(x, v) = min
∅6=S,T⊂N
(
min
{
ev(S,x), ev(T,x)
}
− ev(S,x)− ev∗(T,x)
)
. (8.15)
2. Λ(x, v∧t) = Λ(x, v) + t for t ∈ R.
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3. The shift game v∧t of v meets LED w.r.t x if, and only if, t ≥ −Λ(x, v).
Proof. See Meinhardt (2018b).
Theorem 8.1 (Sudho¨lter (1997a); Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2007)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game and let 〈N¯ , v˜〉
its associated dual cover as given by Definition 8.1, then ς∗(N, v) = ν∗(N¯ , v˜)N , that is, the modiclus of
game 〈N, v〉 coincides with the restriction of the pre-nucleolus of the dual cover game 〈N¯ , v˜〉 to N .
Proof. See Meinhardt (2018b).
Lemma 8.3 (Sudho¨lter (1997a)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game. The pre-nucleolus of each shift game of v is
equal to the pre-nucleolus of v, i.e., ν∗(N, v) = ν∗(N, v∧t) for all t ∈ R.
Lemma 8.4 (Sudho¨lter (1997a,b)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game. If x is Pareto optimal, then the ECC game
vx satisfies LED w.r.t. x. Moreover, it holds vx(S) = v˜N,x(S)+ t for all S ⊂ N and vx(N) = v(N) with
t := (κ + κ∗). Whereas the game v˜N,x is specified by Lemma 8.1.
Proof. See Meinhardt (2018b).
Corollary 8.1 (Meinhardt (2018b)). Let 〈N, v〉 fulfills LED w.r.t. x, then
1. the ECC game is given by vx(S) = v(S) + κ for all S ⊆ N and vx(N) = v(N);
2. the reduced game v˜N,x coincides with v.
Whereas the game v˜N,x is specified by Lemma 8.1.
REMARK 8.1.
In accordance with the second assertion of Corollary 8.1 and in connection with Theorem 8.1, the following
relationship between the modiclus and pre-nucleolus is immediately revealed
ς∗(N, v) = ν∗(N¯ , v˜)N = ν
∗(N, v˜N,x) = ν
∗(N, v), (8.16)
whenever 〈N, v〉 fulfills LED w.r.t. x. ✸
Definition 8.3 (Diverse Solution Properties). Let σ be a solution concept on the set G, and U the universe
of players.
1. A solution σ on G is called reasonable from above (REAB), if 〈N, v〉 ∈ G,x ∈ σ(N, v), then x ≤ r,
whereas r is defined by 8.2 (1a).
2. A solution σ on G is called reasonable from below (REBE), if 〈N, v〉 ∈ G,x ∈ σ(N, v), then x ≥ l,
whereas l is defined by 8.2 (1b).
3. A solution σ on G is called reasonable (RE) from both sides, if it meets REBE as well as REAB.
4. A solution σ on G fulfills excess comparability (EC), if 〈N, v〉 ∈ G,x ∈ σ(N, v) and 〈N, vx〉 ∈ G,
then x ∈ σ(N, vx), whereas 〈N, vx〉 is defined by 8.2 (3).
5. A solution σ satisfies the large excess difference consistency (LEDCONS), if for 〈N, v〉 ∈ G,x ∈
σ(N, v) and v satisfies LED w.r.t. x, then 〈S, vS,x 〉 ∈ G and xS ∈ σ(S, vS,x).
6. A solution σ meets the dual replication property (DRP), if for 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, for a bijection ϑ ∈
Sym(N¯) with N¯ = N ⊎ N∗ s.t. 〈ϑN¯, w¯〉 ∈ G, where w¯ := ϑv¯ (cf. Equation (8.7)), and if x ∈
σ(N, v), then ϑ(x,x∗) ∈ σ(ϑN¯, w¯).
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7. A solution σ meets the dual cover property (DCP), if for 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, for a bijection ϑ ∈ Sym(N¯)
with N¯ = N ⊎ N∗ s.t. 〈ϑN¯, w˜〉 ∈ G, where w˜ := (ϑv˜)∧t with t = 6dv(N) (cf. Equation (8.10)),
and if x ∈ σ(N, v), then ϑ(x,x∗) ∈ σ(ϑN¯, w˜).
Lemma 8.5 (Sudho¨lter (1997a)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game.
1. Let ~y := ν∗(N, v) be the pre-nucleolus of v. If v fulfills LED w.r.t. ~y, then ~y = ς∗(N, v).
2. Consider a pre-imputation x ∈ I∗(N, v) and a proper coalition ∅ 6= S ⊆ N . If v satisfies LED
w.r.t. x, then 〈S, vS,x 〉 satisfies LED w.r.t. xS .
3. Let t := 6 · dv(N), and assume that the pre-imputation ~x ∈ I∗(N, v) is reasonable on both sides
w.r.t. v, then the shifted dual cover game v˜∧t fulfills LED w.r.t. the symmetric pre-imputation x :=
(~x, ~x ∗) ∈ SI∗(N¯ , v˜).
4. Let v satisfies LED w.r.t. ~x ∈ I∗(N, v), then v fulfills LED w.r.t. ~y := ν∗(N, v).
Proof. See Meinhardt (2018b)
A characterization of the modiclus in terms of the above properties can be given by:
Theorem 8.2 (Sudho¨lter (1997a)). LetU be an infinite player set. Then the modiclus is the unique solution
concept on GU satisfying SIVA, COV, EC, LEDCONS, and DCP, whereas DCP can also be replaced by
DRP.
Proof. See Meinhardt (2018b).
Alternatively, the axiomatization of the modiclus can be characterized by SIVA, COV, DCP, and de-
rived game property (DGP), which is a modification of the reduced game property w.r.t. the modiclus. This
characterization comes very close to those of the pre-nucleolus, which is provided by SIVA, anonymity
(AN), COV, and the reduced game property (RGP). This reveals that the modiclus is a derivative of the
pre-nucleolus (cf. Meinhardt (2018b)).
8.2 SOME DUAL GAME PROPERTIES TO CHARACTERIZE THE MODICLUS
In order to derive a characterization of the modiclus that is based on the preventive power of coalitions, we
need to introduce and discuss some dual game properties, which we shall provide here within the original
game context. Hence, we referring to the preventive power of a coalition without leaving the original game
and introducing the dual game. We avoid by this construction that we are pointing to a different stylized
bargaining scenario with the consequence that we are therefore changing the theoretical framework in
which subjects are involved.
The minimal excess of game v w.r.t. the distribution x is given by
κ(x, v) := min
S⊆N
ev(S,x).
It is evident that from this and ev(S,x) = −ev∗(N\S,x) for all S ⊆ N and x ∈ I∗(N, v), we get
κ(x, v) = −max
S⊆N
ev
∗
(N\S,x) = −κ(x, v∗).
Definition 8.4 (SED and Diverse Game Properties). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game.
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1. Let x ∈ I∗(N, v) be a pre-imputation, and define the excess comparability floor game 〈N, v#x 〉 by
v#x (S) :=
{
v(S) ifS ∈ {∅, N},
min
{
v(S) + κ + 2κ∗, v∗(S) + κ∗ + 2κ
}
otherwise,
(8.17)
for all S ⊆ N with κ := κ(x, v) and κ∗ := κ(x, v∗). More concisely, we denote the excess
comparability floor game as ECF game.
2. For each x ∈ I∗(N, v), we define the small excess difference by
Λ(x, v) := max
∅6=T⊂N
(
v(T )− v∗(T ))− κm, (8.18)
whereas κm := min{ev(S,x) | ∅ 6= S ⊂ N} indicates the minimal nontrivial excess at the pre-
imputation x. It is applied the convention that min ∅ = ∞ and max ∅ = −∞ holds, in addition,
with Λ(x, v) = 0, if |N | = 1.
3. The TU game 〈N, v〉 possesses the small excess difference property (SED) w.r.t. x ∈ I∗(N, v), if
Λ(x, v) ≤ 0 holds.
REMARK 8.2 (Meinhardt (2018b)).
Notice that a TU game 〈N, v〉 possesses the small excess difference property (SED) w.r.t. x if, and only
if, the dual game 〈N, v∗〉 of v possesses the large excess difference property (LED) w.r.t. x (cf. For-
mula (8.13)). To observe this, assume that the dual game 〈N, v∗〉 fulfills LED w.r.t. x, henceΛ(x, v∗) ≥ 0,
from which we get the subsequent chain of equivalence relations:
Λ(x, v∗) := min
∅6=T⊂N
(
v∗(N\T )− v(N\T ))− κ ≥ 0
⇐⇒ min
∅6=T⊂N
(
v(N)− v(T )− v(N\T ))− max
∅6=S⊂N
(
ev
∗
(N\S,x)) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ − max
∅6=T⊂N
(
v(T ) + v(N\T )− v(N))− max
∅6=S⊂N
(− ev(S,x)) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ − max
∅6=T⊂N
(
v(T )− v∗(T ))+ min
∅6=S⊂N
(
ev(S,x)
) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ max
∅6=T⊂N
(
v(T )− v∗(T ))− min
∅6=S⊂N
(
ev(S,x)
) ≤ 0
⇐⇒ max
∅6=T⊂N
(
v(T )− v∗(T ))− κm =: Λ(x, v) ≤ 0
Conversely, a TU game 〈N, v〉 satisfies the LED property w.r.t. x if, and only if, its dual 〈N, v∗〉 satisfies
the SED property w.r.t. x. Thus, we can refer to an induced property of the preventive power within the
original game context (bargaining context) without explicitly introducing the dual game. Finally, recognize
that a game might satisfy both, i.e., LED and SED, or at least one of those, or none of those w.r.t. x. ✸
Definition 8.5 (Dual Floor). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game and let ϑ : N → N∗ be a bijective map with
i 7→ ϑ(i) such that N¯ = N ⊎N∗. Define the dual floor game, denoted as 〈N¯ , ˜˜v〉, by
˜˜v(S ⊎ T ∗) := min{v(S) + v∗(T ), v∗(S) + v(T )} ∀ S, T ⊆ N (8.19)
which is called the dual floor of game v.
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The game 〈N˜ , ˜˜v〉 as defined by Equation (8.19) is the floor of the dual extension of 〈N, v〉 and the
primal extension of the dual game 〈N, v∗〉. This game reflects a prudence assessment of the combined
influence of the potential (primal) and preventive (dual) power of a pair of coalitions in a stylized bargain-
ing scenario. The game is the reverse counterpart to the dual cover game that accounts for an optimistic
assessment of the combined influence of the primal and dual extension.
Consider a game 〈N, v 〉 ∈ G, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and let x ∈ I∗(N, v). The anti-reduced game w.r.t. S and
x is the game 〈S, v#S,x 〉 as given by
v#S,x(T ) :=


0 if T = ∅
v(N)− x(N\S) if T = S
minQ⊆N\S (v(T ∪Q)− x(Q)) otherwise.
(8.20)
The definition leads to the idea to impose a particular consistency requirement on a solution concept – in
order to qualify as a desirable outcome of a game – while incorporating the preventive power of outsiders
in the sense that partners can only referring to their smallest claim. This is a weaker requirement on a
solution concept that ought to be satisfied as under the Davis/Maschler reduced game. Under this scenario
partners of a subgroup S focus on a pessimistic view that the preventive power of outsiders allows them
only to capture the smallest amount that would be obtainable while entering into a joint cooperation with
outsiders to enforce higher shares for them in a negotiation. As a consequence, partners can only refer to
weaker claims to get higher shares w.r.t. a proposal x, which was offered during a negotiation. This means
that a solution can be classified as stable or consistent provided that the preventive power of outsiders
discourage any subgroup of players to deviate from the proposal while leaving the grand coalition in order
to play their own game with the help of some outsiders. In this context, the imposed norm on the solution,
which we denote anti-reduced game property (ARGP), can also be seen as subgame perfectness or a
stability requirement of a cooperative solution concept. As worked out by Meinhardt (2018b), the anti-pre-
nucleolus fulfills ARGP. This means roughly stated that all possible projections of the anti-pre-nucleolus
of the default game onto the restricted sets equal the anti-pre-nucleolus of the associated anti-reduced
games. We formalize this notion by incorporating the subsequent definition:
Definition 8.6 (Anti-RGP). A solution σ on G satisfies the anti-reduced game property (ARGP), if for
〈N, v〉 ∈ G, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and x ∈ σ(N, v), then 〈S, v#S,x 〉 ∈ G and xS ∈ σ(S, v#S,x).
Lemma 8.6. Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game and y := ν #(N, v) be the anti-pre-nucleolus of v. In addition,
consider a pre-imputation x ∈ I∗(N, v) and a proper coalition ∅ 6= S ⊆ N .
1. If v fulfills SED w.r.t. y, then y = ς∗(N, v).
2. If v satisfies SED w.r.t. x, then 〈S, v#S,x 〉 satisfies SED w.r.t. xS for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ N .
3. Let t := −6 · dv(N), and assume that the pre-imputation ~x ∈ I∗(N, v) is reasonable on both
sides w.r.t. v, then the shifted dual floor game ˜˜v∧t fulfills SED w.r.t. the symmetric pre-imputation
x := (~x, ~x ∗) ∈ SI∗(N¯ , ˜˜v).
4. Let v satisfies SED w.r.t. ~x ∈ I∗(N, v), then v fulfills SED w.r.t. ~y := ν #(N, v).
Proof. See Meinhardt (2018b)
Example 8.1. Again resume Example 4.1. We have worked out by Example 7.1 that the modiclus is identi-
cal to the anti-pre-nucleolus of game v, which was given by the pre-imputation x := (8, 53/12, 37/12, 1/2).
In order to observe whether the game satisfies either LED or SED w.r.t. the vector x, we compute the
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large excess difference and the small excess difference, which are given by Λ(x, v) = −15.5 < 0 and
Λ(x, v) = 0 respectively. From the latter result we realize that the game must fulfill SED w.r.t. the payoff
vector x. Hence, the pre-imputation x must be an element of the core due to Meinhardt (2018b, Lemma
7.2). In view of Lemma 8.6 we notice that the game satisfies SED w.r.t. the anti-pre-nucleolus, from which
it immediately follows that it must coincide with the modiclus of the game. Thus, the modiclus belongs to
the core of game v.
For a more thorough discussion of this topic, we refer the reader to Meinhardt (2018b).
Definition 8.7 (SEDCONS and REC). Let σ be a solution concept on the set G, and U the universe of
players.
1. A solution σ satisfies the small excess difference consistency (SEDCONS), if for 〈N, v〉 ∈ G,x ∈
σ(N, v) and v satisfies SED w.r.t. x, then 〈S, v#S,x 〉 ∈ G and xS ∈ σ(S, v#S,x).
2. A solution σ on G fulfills reverse excess comparability (REC), if 〈N, v〉 ∈ G,x ∈ σ(N, v) and
〈N, v#x 〉 ∈ G, then x ∈ σ(N, v#x ).
3. A solution σ meets the primal replication property (PRP), if for 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, for a bijection ϑ ∈
Sym(N¯) with N¯ = N ⊎ N∗ s.t. 〈ϑN¯, w¯∗〉 ∈ G, where w¯∗ := ϑv¯∗ (cf. Equation (8.8)), and if
x ∈ σ(N, v), then ϑ(x,x∗) ∈ σ(ϑN¯, w¯∗).
4. A solution σ meets the dual floor property (DFP), if for 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, for a bijection ϑ ∈ Sym(N¯)
with N¯ = N ⊎N∗ s.t. 〈ϑN¯, ˜˜w〉 ∈ G, where ˜˜w := (ϑ˜˜v)∧t with t = −6dv(N) (cf. Equation (8.19)),
and if x ∈ σ(N, v), then ϑ(x,x∗) ∈ σ(ϑN¯, ˜˜w).
REMARK 8.3.
The idea behind the excess comparability floor game 〈N, v#x 〉 is analogous to that of the ECC game vx,
and can be summarized as follows: Consider a Pareto optimal offer x from the set I∗(N, v) to divide the
proceeds of v(N). In order to obtain such a division, the partners involved of the offer to split the revenue
have agreed upon that the figure of argumentation must consider the potential as well as the preventive
power of coalitions, but by a reflective consideration. As a consequence, the resultant dissatisfaction
alluded to the proposal x incorporates the combined smallest degree of dissatisfaction that arises with
the proposal x, that is, the combined smallest losses of the potential and preventive power that a proper
subgroup of partners must bear while either pointing to the exercised or preventive power. These losses
have taken into account by a comparable and purely symmetrical consideration w.r.t. the offer x. This is
accomplished that the modified minimal excesses w.r.t. v and v∗ coincide. For a proper coalition these
amounts were corrected either by its worth v(S) or by its preventive value v∗(S). These values give pairs
of comparable modified excesses w.r.t. x, where the smallest level of dissatisfaction is selected. #
Having discussed these properties, we can provide an axiomatization of the modiclus that is based on
the preventive power of coalitions without explicitly pointing to the dual game.
Theorem 8.3 (Meinhardt (2018b)). LetU be an infinite player set. Then the modiclus is the unique solution
concept on GU satisfying SIVA, COV, SEDCONS, REC, and DFP, whereas DFP can also be replaced by
PRP.
Proof. Meinhardt (2018b)
Nevertheless, in view of this axiomatization of the modiclus is still pointing to different game as well
as to different solution contexts via SEDCONS, REC and DFP or PRP (see also Meinhardt (2018b)).
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9 REPLICATION OF RELATED SOLUTIONS
This Section is devoted to study replication results of related solutions of the pre-kernel with the help of
indirect function approach. This shall allow us to derive replication results of the modiclus. By an ini-
tial step, we establish that the modiclus is identical to the pre-nucleolus or even to the anti-pre-nucleolus
under regular conditions for a class of shifted games. In a next step, we extend these results while ap-
plying the indirect function approach. In this context, the game properties of the preceding sections are
quite helpful to derive these replication results w.r.t. the modiclus. The main results are referring to the
ECC (cf. Theorem 9.1) and to the ECF game (cf. Corollary 9.9) respectively. Moreover, in accordance
with the preventive power of coalitions, there is also close relationship to the anti-pre-nucleolus with the
consequence that we can apply these properties to get even for an exposed element of the anti-pre-kernel a
replication result (cf. Proposition 9.2). Though this relationship meets our expectation, when we remem-
ber us that for the class of PS, weighted graph, and modest bankruptcy games the modiclus coincides with
the anti-pre-nucleolus (cf. Meinhardt (2018b, Section 10)).
In order to start with our discussion, we provide a simplification of the anti-reduced game ˜˜v#N,x
w.r.t. the grand coalition N and a pre-imputation x (cf. Definition (8.20)), which we restate here with-
out proof through:
Lemma 9.1 (Meinhardt (2018b)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game and let 〈N¯ , ˜˜v〉 its associated dual floor as
given by Definition 8.5 and take x := (~x, ~x ∗) ∈ SI∗(N¯ , ˜˜v), then the anti-reduced game ˜˜v#N,x is specified
by
˜˜v#N,x(S) :=


0 if S = ∅
v(N) if S = N
min
{
v(S) + κ(~x, v∗), v∗(S) + κ(~x, v)
}
otherwise.
(9.1)
In addition, the minimal excesses of game v¯∗, v¯, ˜˜v and w := ˜˜v#N,x w.r.t. x are given by κ(x, w) =
κ(x, ˜˜v) = κ(x, v¯) = κ(x, v¯∗) = κ∗ + κ. Notice that w is the anti-reduced game of ˜˜v w.r.t. coali-
tion N and x.
Proof. See Meinhardt (2018b).
Proposition 9.1 (Meinhardt (2018b)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game, set ~y := ς∗(N, v), and let t0 ∈ R be a
critical number s.t. Λ(~y, v∧t0) ≥ 0 is satisfied. If ν∗(N, v) = ν∗(N, v~y), then ς∗(N, v) = ς∗(N, v∧t0).
Proof. Set u := v∧t0 and by the supposition Λ(~y, u) ≥ 0, the game u fulfills LED w.r.t. ~y. Notice that
due to Lemma 8.2 (2) such a critical number t0 ∈ R can be assured. Recall now the Theorems 2.1, 8.1,
and the Lemmata 8.3, 8.4, then
y := ς∗(N, v) = ν∗(N¯ , v˜)N = ν
∗(N, v˜N,y) = ν
∗(N, v~y).
In the next step define w := u~y. In this respect, remind Corollary 8.1 and Remark 8.1, from which we
deduce in connection with LED
ς∗(N, u) = ν∗(N¯ , u˜)N = ν
∗(N, u˜N,y) = ν
∗(N, u)
= ν∗(N,w) = ν∗(N, v∧t) = ν∗(N, v),
whereas t := 2 · t0 + κ(x, v). Notice that from Corollary 8.1 (2), we get u = u˜N,y, and from Corol-
lary 8.1 (1), we obtain
w = u+ ~κu = v + t¯0 + ~κ
u = v + 2 · t¯0 + ~κv = v + t¯,
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with t¯0 := (t0, 0) for t0 ∈ R2n−1; t¯ := (t, 0) for t ∈ R2n−1; ~κu := (~κ(x, u), 0) ∈ R2n−1 as well as
~κv := (~κ(x, v), 0) ∈ R2n−1. Hence, we can apply Lemma 8.3.
By hypothesis, we have ν∗(N, v) = ν∗(N, v~y), but then ς∗(N, v) = ς∗(N, u) immediately follows.
Corollary 9.1 (Meinhardt (2018b)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game, put ~y := ς∗(N, v), and choose t0 ∈ R as a
critical number s.t. Λ(~y, v∧t0) ≤ 0 is satisfied. If ν #(N, v) = ν#(N, v#~y ), then ς∗(N, v) = ς∗(N, v∧t0).
Proof. For a proof see Meinhardt (2018b).
Corollary 9.2 (Meinhardt (2018b)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game, put ~y := ς∗(N, v), and choose t0 ∈ R as
a critical number s.t. Λ(~y, v∧t0) ≥ 0 is satisfied. If ν∗(N, v∧t1) = ν∗(N, (v∧t1)~y) for a number t1 < t0,
then ς∗(N, v∧t) = ς∗(N, v∧t0) for all t ≥ t1.
Corollary 9.3 ( Meinhardt (2018b)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game, put ~y := ς∗(N, v), and choose t0 ∈ R as a
critical number s.t. Λ(~y, v∧t0) ≤ 0 is satisfied. If ν #(N, v∧t1) = ν #(N, (v∧t1)#~y ) for a number t1 > t0,
then ς∗(N, v∧t) = ς∗(N, v∧t0) for all t ≤ t1.
REMARK 9.1 ( Meinhardt (2018b)).
From the preceding results we infer that ν #(N, v#~y ) is determined by a shifted game v
∧t, and the irrelevant
game ˜˜v#N,y − v in accordance with v#~y = v + t¯ + ˜˜v#N,y − v. This holds true whenever no coalition that
determines ν#(N, ˜˜v#N,y−v) appears in the determination set of ν#(N, v∧t). This allows a decomposition
of v#~y in the sense of Herna´ndez-Lamoneda et al. (2007) by the games v
∧t, and ˜˜v#N,y − v s.t. ν #(N, v) =
ν #(N, v#~y ) is given. This means that the anti-pre-nucleolus of game v
#
~y can be dissected in two parts,
since we have ν #(N, v#~y ) = ν
#(N, ˜˜v#N,y − v) + ν#(N, v∧t) = ν#(N, v∧t). Notice in this respect
that it is not enough here that we get ν#(N, ˜˜v#N,y − v) = 0. If there is a non-empty intersection of
the determination sets, we obtain nevertheless then ν #(N, v#~y ) 6= ν #(N, ˜˜v#N,y − v) + ν#(N, v∧t) =
ν #(N, v∧t). Of course, analogous arguments can be applied for the pre-nucleolus of the ECC game v~y.
✸
Proposition 9.1 imposes very crude conditions on the primal power of a game in order to provide
a coincidence results of modicli. However, the proposition neither tells us where the crucial condition
ν∗(N, v) = ν∗(N, v~y) is coming from nor of how we can assure those. To shed more light on this
issue, we have to rely on some techniques and results introduced in Sections 3 & 4 (see also the the work
of Meinhardt (2013)). Proceeding in this direction, we need to recall some definitions and notations as
used for the discussion on Section 3 and Theorem 4.1. In particular, we have recall the critical numbers
δεij(x) ∈ R from Section 4, which we restate here for convenience sake
δεij(x) := max {δ ∈ R |x i,j,δ = x− δ 1i + δ 1j ∈ ε} ∀ i, j ∈ N, i 6= j. (4.3)
That is, the number δεij(x) is the maximum amount that can be transferred from i to j while remaining in
the ellipsoid ε, which is well defined number for convex sets having non-empty interior.
Theorem 9.1 (ECC Game and Replication of the Modiclus). Let v∆ := v˜N,y− v and put ~y := ν∗(N, v~y).
If the induced payoff equivalence class [~γ] of the ECC game 〈N, v~y〉 has non-empty interior s.t. {~y} =
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PK(N, v~y) ⊂ [~γ] and v∆ ∈ [−C,C]p′ with
C := min
i,j∈N,i 6=j
{ ±
√
c¯
‖E⊤(1j − 1i)‖

}
, (9.2)
as well as 0 6= ∆ ∈ NW = {∆ ∈ Rp ′ | W∆ = 0} with matrix W := V⊤U, then {~y} = {ν∗(N, v)} =
PK(N, v). Furthermore, we get ς∗(N, v) = ς∗(N, v∧t0) for t0 as given by Proposition 9.1.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4 ~y i,j,δ
ε ∈ ε ⊂ [~γ], is a unique boundary point of the ellipsoid ε of type (3.15) with
maximum volume. We conclude that either (1) sij(~y
i,j,δε , v~y) = sij(~y, v
~y) + δεij(~y) if S ∈ Gij , or (2)
sji(~y
i,j,δε , v~y) = sji(~y, v
~y) − δεij(~y) if S ∈ Gji, or otherwise (3) sij(~y i,j,δ
ε
, v~y) = sij(~y, v
~y) is satisfied.
Moreover, let v, v~y, v∆ ∈ Rp′ and notice that the ECC game v~y can be decomposed in accordance with
Lemma 8.4 s.t. v~y = v∧t + v∆ ∈ Rp′ is given. For convenience sake, we can rewrite the ECC game as
v~y = v∧t + v∆ = U(λv
∧t
+∆) = U(λv + λt +∆)
with 0 6= ∆ ∈ NW and v∆ = U∆. Then it holds v~y(S) = v(S) + t + v∆(S) for all S ∈ 2n\{N, ∅}
and v~y(N) = v(N). In the next step, extend the pre-kernel element ~y to a vector y by the measure
y(S) :=
∑
k∈S yk for all S ∈ 2n\{∅}, then define the excess vector by e ~y := v~y − y. Due to these
definitions, we obtain the following chain of equalities
0 = ~ξ v
~y
= V⊤ e ~y = V⊤ (v~y − y) = V⊤ (v − y + t¯+ v∆)
⇐⇒ 0 = V⊤ (v − y) +V⊤ t¯+V⊤ v∆ = V⊤ (v − y) = V⊤ e = ~ξ,
for ~ξ v
~y
at ~y under the assumption that ~y := ν∗(N, v~y) holds true from which ~ξ v
~y
= 0 must be deduced
(cf. Meinhardt (2013)). Observe that in this context we have V⊤ t¯ = 0 as well as
V
⊤ v∆ = V⊤U∆ = W∆ = 0
in accordance with the imposed assumptions.
In terms of Lemma 4.3 the system of excesses remains balanced w.r.t. the game v, since ~ξ = 0.
Implying that the system of maximum surpluses remains invariant on a hypercube specified by the critical
values of the ellipsoid ε, since by hypothesis the expression v∆(S) belongs to the non-empty interval
[−C,C] for S ∈ 2n\{∅}. This interval specifies the range in which the game parameter can vary without
having any impact on the set of most effective coalitions given by S(~y). Thus, the coalitions S(~y) still
have maximum surpluses for the game defined by v = Uλv due to the imposed condition U∆ = v∆ ∈
[−C,C]p′ . Hence the pre-kernel solution ~y of game v~y is invariant against a change in the hypercube
[−C,C]p′ . In view of the Propositions 4.1 to 4.3 and Theorem 4.3, we draw the conclusion that ν∗(N, v) =
ν∗(N, v~y) must be in force. By the first part, the sufficient condition of Proposition 9.1 is satisfied, from
which we obtain ς∗(N, v) = ς∗(N, v∧t0). This arguments closes the second part.
REMARK 9.2 (Replication of the Modiclus).
Theorem 9.1 states that the modicli of the original game and an appropriate t-shift of that game coincide
provided that the pre-nucleolus as an interior solution within a payoff equivalence induced by the cor-
responding ECC game remains invariant against a change in the game parameter. This means, that the
pre-nucleolus of the default game belongs to the same equivalence class as under the ECC game implying
that the set of most effective coalitions remains unaffected by this change in the parameter space. As a
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consequence, the pre-kernel properties prevail and due to the validness of Theorem 4.3 even those of the
pre-nucleolus. This allows us to employ Proposition 9.1 from which the replication result of modiclus
can be finally deduced. Hence, the Theorem provides a rule of how one has to construct a game in order
to replicate its modiclus. Obviously, reflected arguments can be applied for the anti-pre-nucleolus and
modiclus #
In the course, we replicate this result for the anti-pre-nucleolus. For doing so, we get a sequence of
results, which are the counterparts to those discussed in Section 4.
Corollary 9.4. If [~γ#] has non-empty interior and x ∈ PK#(v) ⊂ [~γ#], then there exists some critical
bounds given by
δε
#
ij (x) =
±√c¯
‖(E#)⊤(1j − 1i)‖ 6= 0 ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, (9.3)
with c¯ > 0 and ‖(E#)⊤(1j − 1i)‖ > 0.
Lemma 9.2. If x ∈ M(hv#γ ), then x ∈ M(hv
µ#
γ ) for all µ ∈ R, where vµ# := U(λv + µ∆) and
0 6= ∆ ∈ N
W
# = {∆ ∈ Rp ′ |W#∆ = 0}, whereW# := (V#)⊤U ∈ Rq×p ′ .
Proof. Let x be a minimizer of function hv#γ under game v, then x remains a minimizer for a function
hv
µ#
γ induced by game vµ wheneverQ# x = −2E# ~α# = −a# remains valid. Since the payoff vector
has induced the matricesQ#,E# and matrix V# defined by
[v#1,2, . . . ,v
#
n−1,n,v0],
where the vectors are defined as by formula (7.13). We simply have to prove that the configuration ~α#
remains invariant against an appropriate change in the game parameter. Observing that matrix W# has
a rank equal to or smaller than q =
(
n
2
)
+ 1, say m ≤ q, then the null space of matrix W# has rank of
p′ −m, thus N
W
# 6= {∅}. But then exists some 0 6= ∆ ∈ Rp′ s.t. ∆ ∈ N
W
# and vµ# = U(λv + µ∆)
for µ ∈ R\{0}, getting
W
# λv
µ
= W# (λv + µ∆) = (V#)⊤ (v + µv∆) = (V#)⊤ v = ~α#,
whereas W#∆ = (V#)⊤ v∆ = 0 with v∆ := U∆. This argument proves that the configuration ~α#
remains invariant against a change in the game parameter space by v∆ 6= 0. This implies that the payoff
vector x is also a minimizer for function hv
µ#
γ under game vµ.
To conclude this discussion, we introduce below the counterparts of the Propositions 4.1 to 4.3, Theo-
rem 4.3 as well as Theorem 9.1.
Corollary 9.5. Let (E#)⊤1 = (E
#)⊤X with X ∈ SO(n), that is [~γ#] ∼ [~γ#1 ]. In addition, assume that
the payoff equivalence class [~γ#] induced from TU game 〈N, v 〉 has non-empty interior such that {x} =
PK#(v) ⊂ [~γ#] is satisfied, then there exists no other anti-pre-kernel element in payoff equivalence class
[~γ#1 ] for a related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉, where vµ = v + µ · v∆ ∈ Rp
′
, as defined by Lemma 9.2.
Corollary 9.6. Impose the same conditions as under Corollary 9.5 with the exception that X ∈ GL+(n),
then there exists no other anti-pre-kernel element in payoff equivalence class [~γ#1 ] for a related TU game
〈N, vµ 〉.
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Corollary 9.7. Assume [~γ#] ≁ [~γ#1 ], and that the payoff equivalence class [~γ
#] induced from TU game
〈N, v 〉 has non-empty interior such that {x} = PK#(v) ⊂ [~γ#] is satisfied, then there exists no other
anti-pre-kernel element in payoff equivalence class [~γ#1 ] for a related TU game 〈N, vµ 〉, where vµ =
v + µ · v∆ ∈ Rp′ , as defined by Lemma 9.2.
So far our investigation focused on an isolated anti-pre-kernel element. However, in order be sure that
a single anti-pre-kernel element of the default game is also the anti-pre-nucleolus of a related game, it
must satisfies Anti-Property I. Its definition reverses the arguments of Property I from Kohlberg (1971).
For introducing this reversed concept, we have to impose first the set
Definition 9.1. For every x ∈ Rn, and ψ ∈ R define the set
D#(N, v;ψ,x) := {S ⊆ N | ev(S,x) ≤ −ψ} . (9.4)
Then we can state the definition of Anti-Property I through
Definition 9.2 (Anti-Property I). A vector x ∈ I∗(N, v) has Anti-Property I w.r.t. TU game 〈N, v 〉, if for
all ψ ∈ R s.t. D#(N, v;ψ,x) 6= ∅,
Z(D#(N, v;ψ,x)) = {z ∈ Rn | z(S) ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ D#(N, v;ψ,x), z(N) = 0},
implies z(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ D#(N, v;ψ,x).
Thus, if the anti-pre-nucleolus does not satisfy Anti-Property I, we can be sure that there must exist at
least a second anti-pre-kernel point for the related game different from the first one. Fortunately, this issue
can be affirmed due to the next result
Corollary 9.8. Let 〈N, v 〉 be a TU game that has a singleton anti-pre-kernel such that {x} = PK#(v) ⊂
[~γ#], and let 〈N, vµ 〉 be a related game of v derived from x, then x = ν#(N, v µ), whereas the payoff
equivalence class [~γ#] has non-empty interior.
Lemma 9.3 ( Meinhardt (2018b)). Let 〈N, v〉 be a TU game. If x is Pareto optimal, then the ECF game
v#x satisfies SED w.r.t. x. Moreover, it holds v
#
x (S) = ˜˜v
#
N,x(S) + t for all S ⊂ N and v#x (N) = v(N)
with t := (κ + κ∗). Whereas the game ˜˜v#N,x is specified by Lemma 9.1.
Proof. See Meinhardt (2018b).
Corollary 9.9 (ECFGame and Replication of theModiclus). Let v∆ := ˜˜vN,y−v and put ~y := ν #(N, v#~y ).
If the induced payoff equivalence class [~γ#] of the ECF game 〈N, v#~y 〉 has non-empty interior s.t. {~y} =
PK#(N, v#~y ) ⊂ [~γ#] and v∆ ∈ [−C#,C#]p
′
with
C
# := min
i,j∈N,i 6=j
{ ±
√
c¯
‖(E#)⊤(1j − 1i)‖

}
, (9.5)
as well as 0 6= ∆ ∈ N
W
# = {∆ ∈ Rp ′ | W#∆ = 0} with matrix W# := (V#)⊤U, and matrix
V
# given by Definition 7.13, then {~y} = {ν #(N, v)} = PK#(N, v). Furthermore, we get ς∗(N, v) =
ς∗(N, v∧t0) for t0 as given by Corollary 9.1.
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Proof. For convenience sake define u := v#~y as well as V
⊤ := (V#)⊤, and put ~y := ν #(N, u). By
Lemma 9.4 ~y i,j,δ
ε# ∈ ε# ⊂ [~γ#], is a unique boundary point of the ellipsoid ε# of type (7.12) with
maximum volume. We conclude that either (1) s#ij (~y
i,j,δε
#
, u) = s#ij (~y, u) + δ
ε#
ij (~y) if S ∈ Gij , or
(2) s#ji (~y
i,j,δε
#
, u) = s#ji (~y, u) − δε
#
ij (~y) if S ∈ Gji, or otherwise (3) s#ij (~y i,j,δ
ε#
, u) = s#ij (~y, u) is
satisfied. Moreover, let v, u, v∆ ∈ Rp′ and notice that the ECF game u can be decomposed in accordance
with Lemma 9.3 s.t. u = v∧t+ v∆ ∈ Rp′ is given. For convenience sake, we can rewrite the ECF game as
u = v∧t + v∆ = U(λv
∧t
+∆) = U(λv + λt +∆)
with 0 6= ∆ ∈ N
W
# and v∆ = U∆. Then it holds u(S) = v(S) + t + v∆(S) for all S ∈ 2n\{N, ∅}
and u(N) = v(N). In the next step, extend the anti-pre-kernel element ~y to a vector y by the measure
y(S) :=
∑
k∈S yk for all S ∈ 2n\{∅}, then define the excess vector by e ~y := v~y − y. Due to these
definitions, we obtain the following chain of equalities
0 = ~ξ v
~y
= V⊤ e ~y = V⊤ (v~y − y) = V⊤ (v − y + t¯+ v∆)
⇐⇒ 0 = V⊤ (v − y) +V⊤ t¯+V⊤ v∆ = V⊤ (v − y) = V⊤ e = ~ξ,
for ~ξ v
~y
at ~y under the assumption that ~y := ν#(N, u) holds true from which ~ξ v
~y
= 0 must be deduced.
Observe that in this context we have V⊤ t¯ = 0 as well as
V
⊤ v∆ = V⊤U∆ = W∆ = 0
in accordance with the imposed assumptions.
Applying the arguments of Lemma 9.2, we observe that the system of excesses remains balanced w.r.t.
the game v, since ~ξ = 0. Implying that the system of minimum surpluses remains invariant on a hypercube
specified by the critical values of the ellipsoid ε#, since by hypothesis the expression v∆(S) belongs to
the non-empty interval [−C#,C#] for S ∈ 2n\{∅}. This interval specifies the range in which the game
parameter can vary without having any impact on the set of less effective coalitions given by S#(~y). Thus,
the coalitions S#(~y) still have minimum surpluses for the game defined by v = Uλv due to the imposed
condition U∆ = v∆ ∈ [−C#,C#]p′ . Hence the anti-pre-kernel point ~y of game v~y is invariant against
a change in the hypercube [−C#,C#]p′ . In view of the arguments from Corollaries 9.5 to 9.8, we draw
the conclusion that ν
#
(N, v) = ν
#
(N, u) must be in force. By the first part, the sufficient condition of
Proposition 9.1 is satisfied, from which we obtain ς∗(N, v) = ς∗(N, v∧t0). This arguments closes the
second part.
Proposition 9.2 (Replication of an Anti-Pre-Kernel Element). Let 〈N, v 〉 ∈ G be a convex game. Set
x := ν#(N, v) and assume that x ∈ C(N, v) holds; put v∆ := ˜˜v#N,x − v, then it holds (V#)⊤ v∆ = 0,
that is, x ∈ PK#(N, v#x ). Whereas the game v#x is given by Definition 8.17, game ˜˜v#N,x is specified by
Lemma 9.1, and matrix V# is imposed by Definition 7.13.
Proof. Set x := ν#(N, v) as well as u := ˜˜v#N,x, and notice that in view of the prerequisite, it holds
x ∈ C(N, v), but then the subsequent inequality is satisfied
u(S)− v(S) = min{v(S) + κ(x, v∗), v∗(S) + κ(x, v)}− v(S)
min
{
κ(x, v∗), v∗(S)− v(S) + κ(x, v)} ≤ 0,
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due to convexity of v for all S ( N . Hence, u ≤ v. Applying similar arguments as in Meinhardt (2013,
Section 7.4 to 7.8) this means that the induced payoff equivalence class [~γ]#v of the anti-reduced game
〈N, v〉, which contains the anti-pre-nucleolus of game v, cannot shrink. Hence, we have [~γ]#v ⊆ [~γ]#u .
Since, we have x ∈ [~γ]#u in connection with hv#γ = hu#γ = hu# on the restriction of [~γ]#v , this implies
−E# z = ~α# for all y ∈ [~γ]v, since all payoffs within an equivalence class induce the same set S#(~γ, v)
of smallest less effective coalitions. Obviously, the equation −E# z = ~α# also holds on the enlarged
convex set [~γ]#u due to S#(y, v) = S#(y, u) for all y ∈ [~γ]#u implying z ∈ PK#(N, u). Therefore,
we have α#ij := (u(S
#
ij ) − u(S#ji )) = (v(S#ij ) − v(S#ji )) with {S#ij } = S#ij (~γ), {S#ji } = S#ji (~γ) for all
i, j ∈ N, i < j, and α#0 := v(N) (cf. Section 7). In accordance with Remark 9.1 the ECF game w := v#x
can be decomposed to v + t¯+ ˜˜v#N,x − v = v + t¯+ v∆. For convenience sake define V⊤ := (V#)⊤ and
extend the vector x to its measure x, but then
~ξ w = V⊤ ew x = V⊤ (w − x) = V⊤ (v − x+ t¯+ v∆)
= V⊤ (v − x) +V⊤ t¯+V⊤ v∆ = V⊤ v∆ = 0,
for ~ξ w at x under the assumption that x := ν#(N, v) holds true from which ~ξ v = 0 must be drawn.
Observe that in this context we have V⊤ t¯ = 0, whereas the last equality arrives from
V
⊤ u = V⊤ v = ~α#,
in accordance with S#(y, v) = S#(y, u) for all y ∈ [~γ]#u . Implying x ∈ PK#(N, v#x ) as requested.
REMARK 9.3.
Notice that we can only assure in the above proof that the anti-pre-nucleolus of a convex game v is an
element of the anti-pre-kernel of game v#x . However, we cannot assure that the anti-pre-nucleolus prop-
erties are preserved under this very specific change in the game parameter. Hence, we can only say that
a payoff vector, which is the anti-pre-nucleolus of game v and must be therefore located inside of the
anti-pre-kernel, remains at least an element of those within a very specific derived game. ✸
10 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have established that the set of related games derived from a default game with a single
pre-kernel point must also possess this element as its single pre-kernel point. Moreover, we have shown
that the pre-kernel correspondence in the game space restricted to the convex hull comprising the default
and related games is single-valued and constant, and therefore continuous. Although we could provide
some sufficient conditions under which the pre-nucleolus of a default game – whereas the pre-kernel
constitutes a line segment – induces at least a disconnected pre-kernel for the set of related games, it is,
however, still an open question if it is possible to obtain from a game with a set-valued pre-kernel some
related games that have a singleton pre-kernel. In this respect, the knowledge of firmer conditions that
preserve the pre-nucleolus property is of particular interest.
Furthermore, we have provided some replication results related to the modiclus and anti-pre-kernel
while applying the same techniques as for the pre-kernel. This demonstrates the versatility of the intro-
duced approach with that the stability issue of some particular bargaining outcomes can be investigated.
Even though we have not provided a new set of game classes with a sole pre-kernel element, we
nevertheless think that the presented approach is also very useful to bring forward our knowledge about
the classes of transferable utility games where the pre-kernel coalesces with the pre-nucleolus. To answer
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this question, one need just to select boundary points of the convex cone of the class of convex games
to enlarge the convex cone within the game space to identify game classes that allow for a singleton pre-
kernel.
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